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mishaps. A study o f  the scope and magnitude o f  mishaps a l s o  provides 
needed informat ion on the  s e l e c t i o n  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  components and/or systems. 
The propulsion, power and l i f e - s u p p o r t  systems p resen t l y  under deveiop- 
ment f o r  use i n  ea r th  o r b i t  manned missions use l a rge  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  oxygen. 
The systems spec i f i ca t i ons  inc lude requirements f o r  extended l i f e  and reuse 
c a p a b i l i t i e s  which could r e s u l t  i n  an increase i n  the number o f  acc idents 
unless cont inu ing  e f f o r t s  a re  app l ied  t o  the  sa fe ty  o f  the oxygen systems. 
NASA SAFETY GOAL 
A s i n g l e  sa fe ty  goal has been imposed by NASA, as a  basic  ground ru le ,  
on the Space S t a t i o n  Phase B study cont rac tors .  This  i s :  "As a  goal, no 
s i n g l e  mal func t ion  o r  c r e d i b l e  combination of mal funct ions and/or acc idents 
s h a l l  r e s u l t  i n  ser ious i n j u r y  t o  personnel o r  t o  crew abandonment o f  the space 
s ta t ion . "  Credib le acc idents w i t h  oxygen could best be es tab l ished from 
past experience. A review o f  acc ident / inc ident  in fo rmat ion  t o  de f i ne  the 
accident, i t s  cause, and t o  recommend modi f i ca t ions ,  con t r i bu tes  t o  a  b e t t e r  
understanding o f  the hazards o f  oxygen which inc lude f i r e ,  explosion, leakage 
and loss o f  p ressur iza t ion .  
This paper presents in fo rmat ion  from a  subs tan t i a l  number o f  oxygen 
mishaps obtained p r i m a r i l y  from NASA and con t rac to r  records. In format ion 
from several A i r  Force records, concerning oxygen accidents i nvo l v ing  a i r c r a f t  
operat ions, are a l so  included. The d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  the mishaps and t h e i r  causes, 
w i t h  both l i q u i d  (LOX) and gaseous oxyS?n (GOX) i n  ground t e s t  f a c i l i t i e s  and 
space v e h i c l e  systems are included i n  Appendix A. The mishaps are  l i s t e d  
under the general heading o f  Accidents/ lnc idents and not  i d e n t i f i e d  as t o  the 
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type of mishap according t o  NASA standards. The NASA Safety Manual ( r e f ,  1 ) 
def  i wes the  var ious  types o f  mishaps according t o  th'e degree o f  seve r i t y ;  
"$Mpe A Accident, Type B Accident; Incident,  Miss ion Contingency and A v i a t i o n  
F l i g h t  Accident   appendix‘^). 
This paper a l s o  includes a  number o f  sa fe t y  regu la t i ons  ainaed a t  reducing 
the accident  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  The problems r e l a t e d  t o  ma te r i a l  c m p a t i b i l i t y  and 
mate r ia l s  t e s t i n g  are discussed, i n d i c a t i n g  the l i m i t e d  in fo rmat ion  on fac tors  
a f f e c t i n g  the  i g n i t i o n  o f  ma te r i a l s  i n  oxygen. I n  add i t ion ,  d e t a i l s  a re  g i ven  
o f  several o f  the  acc idents / inc idents  l i s t e d  i n  Appendix A  t o  de f i ne  the  cam- 
b i n e t i o n  o f  cond i t ions .caus ing  the mishap. The need f o r  f u r t h e r  research i s  
a l so  indicated.  
The p r i n c i p a l  source o f  the oxygen accident  in fo rmat ion  was a  compi la t ion  
o f  mishaps cover ing  several years o f  manned space f l i g h t  a c t i v i t y  by NASA 
About 500 accidents/ , inc idents were selected from approximately 10,000 
documents reviewed and are  publ ished i n  the reference repo r t .  The se lec t ions  
were based on mishaps which re f , lec ted  s i g n i f i c a n t  lessons and on occurrences 
which involved equipment and f a c i l i t i e s  p rov id ing  d i r e c t  support t o  the space 
program and on occurrences r e s u l t i n g  i n  personnel f a t a l i t i e s  and/or i n j u r i e s ,  
The descr i p t  ion b f  the mishaps, poss ib le  causes, and recommended c o r r e c t i v e  
ac t ions  are  included. I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  n rope l l an t  system mishaps, the reference 
repo r t  includes acc ident / inc idents  which have occurred t o  space and ground 
system s t ruc tures ;  e l e c t r i c a l  systems, ground support f a c i l i t i e s ,  ordnance 
and r e l a t e d  operat ions. The mishaps p e r t a i n i n g  t o  oxygen were selected f r o m  
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the  re fe rence  r e p o r t  and a r e  inc luded  i n  t h i s  paper, Pn a d d i t i o n ,  oxygen 
mishaps which have occur red  i n  programs no t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  t h e  
Manned Space Program a re  inc luded,  
A l though many of  t h e  mishap r e p o r t s  d i d  no t  c o n t a i n  comp le te ly  
s a t i s f a c t o r y  i n f o rma t i on  as t o  the  t echn i ca l  coverage o f  t he  causes and 
c o r r e c t i v e  ac t ions ,  the  a v a i l a b l e  i n f o r m a t i o n  was used t o  e s t a b l i s h  ca tego r i es  
o f  events caus ing the  mishap. The causes have been ca tego r i zed  i n  an e f f o r t  
t o  o b t a i n  a d d i t i o n a l  lessons from t h e  mishap r e p o r t s .  The ca tego r i es  i nc l ude  
t he  f o l l o w i n g :  
A. M a t e r i a l s  I n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  De f i c i ency  
Th is  bas i c  cause o f  oxygen mishaps inc ludes  incompat ib le  m a t e r i a l s  
brought  t oge the r  because of e r r o r s  i n  design, i n s t a l l a t i o n ,  f a b r i c a t i o n  
and ope ra t i ona l  procedures.  
5, M a t e r i a l s  F a i l u r e  
Inc ludes f a i l u r e  o f  m a t e r i a l s  o r  components due t o  s t resses  w i t h i n  
the  des ign  l i m i t s .  These i nc l ude  f a i l u r e s  o f  p ipes, tub ing,  valves,  
pump, e t c .  d u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n  o r  d u r i n g  development t e s t s  under c o n d i t i o n s  
w i t h i n  t h e i r  des ign  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .  
Desiyn D e f i c i e n c y  C -  -
lncPudes inadequate component o r  system des ign  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  which 
c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  the  occurrence o f  t he  mishap. 
Cleaning De f i c i ency  
D o  - 
This  f a c t o r  has been i d e n t i f i e d  as a  separate  cause which con- 
t r i b u t e d  o r  was respons ib l e  f o r  t he  mishap. 
. Procedural Def ic ienc ies  
i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  the acc idents / inc idents  according t o  
of 55 mishaps f o r  1 i q u i d  oxygen and 47 f o r  gaseous oxygen are  1 i 
Appendix A and were used t o  e s t a b l i s h  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  shown i n  the f 
the mishap. For both l i q u i d  and gas, procedural d e f i c i e n c i e s  
l a rges t  number o f  mishaps, c l o s e l y  fo l lowed by design d e f i c i e n c i e  
F igure 3 shows the comparison o f  the number o f  mishap causes f o r  
ween the ma te r ia l s  and oxygen, we should expect a g reater  numbe 
hot  spots cou ld  not occur w i thout  the presence o f  the gaseous phase a 
t. The l a rge  heat s i n k  provided by LOX contact  precludes hot  spot 
quid, therefore, would have a reduced e f f e c t  on i n i t i a t i n g  any reac 
e gaseous s ta te .  Ad iabat ic  compress:on as a means o f  producing h 
emperature f o r  i g n i t i o n  of  the ma te r ia l s  a l s o  becomes i n e f f i c i e n t  a t  
ryogenic temperatures. The t h e o r e t i c a l  temperature due t o  ad iaba t i c  
e r a t i o  of s p e c i f i c  heats (1.4 f o r  oxygen). A pressure r a t i o  of abo 
capable o f  producing a temperature r a t i o  o f  3, would heat oxygen, i n i t i a l l y  
a t  300°K t o  900°K whereas the same pressure r a t i o  app l i ed  t o  oxygen a t  90.1°K 
would heat a gas bubble t o  270°K. Temperatures of 900°K cou ld  be obta ined 
i n  a co ld  gas bubble bu t  the pressure requ i red  would be about 3100 atm. i f  
the i n i t i a l  pressure was 1 atmosphere. 
Ma te r i a l  f a i l u r e s  account f o r  more mishaps i n  l i q u i d  than gaseous 
oxygen and are  probably due t o  the change i n  mechanical p rope r t i es  o f  the 
ma te r ia l s  used a t  the  low temperatures. The change i n  toughness f o r  both 
d u c t i l e  and b r i t t l e  ma te r i a l s  a t  low temperatures are  u s u a l l y  taken i n t o  
account i n  the design o f  equipment but  t h i s  in fo rmat ion  i s  probably the 
l e a s t  understood o f  the low temperature mechanical p roper t ies .  Toughness 
measurement techniques inc lude impact tests,  notch t e n s i l e  t e s t s  and t e n s i l e  
e longat ion  t e s t s  bu t  the behavior o f  the ma te r ia l s  under stress, e s p e c i a l l y  
i n  the  presence o f  f laws, a t  the low temperatures are  no t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  under- 
stood t o  avoid mishaps. 
The d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  the mishaps according t o  the d e f i c i e n c i e s  l i s t e d  
show many outstanding examples of f a i l u r e s  t o  heed sa fe ty  procedures as w e l l  
as many areas f o r  improvement. The prepara t ion  of  d e t a i l e d  procedures f o r  
the handl ing o f  oxygen and the enforcement o f  such procedures would reduce 
the  number o f  mishaps. These procedures should inc lude not  on ly  d e t a i l s  f o r  
the safe opera t ion  o f  oxygen systems but  a l s o  the presenta t ion  o f  the planning, 
t ra in ing ,  q u a l i t y  con t ro l  and management superv is ion methods t o  enforce 
the recommended procedures. lmprovements i n  both component and systems design 
would a l s o  have a major e f f e c t  i n  reducing the number o f  mishaps. 
F i res  and explosions have been responsible f o r  t he  major losses i n  
equ imen t  and f o r  most o f  the f a t a l i t i e s  t h a t  have occurred, m e  mate r ia l s  
reac t  w i t h  the  gaseous oxygen bu t  the  source of i g n i t i o n  responsible f o r  
the i n i t i a t i o n  o f  the  f i r e  and explos ion mishaps i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  i so la te .  
The acc ident / inc ident  s tud les  have ind ica ted t h a t  impact, f r i c t i o n ,  
chemical r e a c t i v i t y ,  s t a t i c  e l e c t r i c i t y ,  e l e c t r i c a l  sparks, and heat due t o  
gas cmpress ion have a l l  been responsib le f o r  the i g n i t i o n  o f  some mate r ia l s  
i n  oxygen. 
A number o f  p r a c t i c a l  sa fe ty  regu la t ions  could be introduced t o  reduce 
accidents caused by procedural and design def ic ienc ies ,  but  mater ia l  c m -  
p a t i b i l i t y  and i g n i t i o n  problems are  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  resolve. m a t  
ma te r ia l s  t o  use f o r  a s p e c i f i c  environment o f  gas o r  l i q u i d  oxygen, h igh  
o r  l aw pressure, etc.  f o r  p o s i t i v e  safe performance cannot be answered. 
Methods o f  eva luat ing  and r a t i n g  ma te r ia l s  f o r  oxygen use have been developed 
( re f .  3,  4, 5) and these studies are  being continued. These eva luat ion  
t e s t s  include determinat ions o f  f l a s h  and f i r e  po in t  and impact s e n s i t i v i t y  
o f  mater ia ls .  The f l a s h  and f i r e  p o i n t  t e s t s  were developed t o  determine 
r e l a t i v e  r e a c t i v i t y  o f  ma te r ia l s  when subjected t o  an e l e c t r i c a l  discharge. 
The f l a s h  p o i n t  i s  the  lowest temperature a t  which a mater ia l  w i l l  g ive  o f f  
flammable vapors that ,  when mixed w i t h  the t e s t  atmosphere and exposed t o  
the spark energy, w i l l  prov ide a non-sel f -susta in ing f l a s h  o r  flame. The 
f i r e  po in t  i s  s i m i l a r  except t h e s m a t e r i a l  gives off flammable vapors 
which cont inue t o  burn a f t e r  i g n i t i o n .  Although many o f  the mishap causes 
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i n d i c a t e  the  use o f  non-compatible ma te r i a l s ,  mishaps have taken p lace  
under c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  which compat ib le  ma te r i a l s ,  based upon e v a l u a t i o n  
t e s t s ,  were used. The c o n d i t i o n s  under which the  m a t e r i a l s  w i l l  o r  w i l l  n o t  
i g n i t e  i n  oxygen a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  p rescr ibe .  The ease o f  i g n i t i o n  depends 
upon t h e  static o f  s u b d i v i s i o n  o f  t he  m a t e r i a \ ,  presence o f  f o r e i g n  m a t e r i a l s  
and many o t h e r  c i rcumstances. S t r u c t u r a l  meta ls  g e n e r a l l y  burn  i n  oxygen 
o n l y  a f t e r  hea t i ng  t o  r e l a t i v e l y  h i gh  temperatures. However, i ron,  lead, 
n i c k e l  and many o the r  meta ls  i g n i t e  spontaneously i n  a i r  i f  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
f i n e l y  divided, The f o r e i g n  m a t e r i a l  i n  an oxygen system f r e q u e n t l y  exe r t s  
a ma jo r  e f f e c t  on t he  r a t e  o f  o x i d a t i o n  reac t ions ,  hence the  need t o  des ign 
an oxygen system i n  a  way t h a t  f a c i l i t a t e s  r i go rous  c lean ing .  The e f f e c t s  
o f  v e l o c i t y ,  mass and shape o f  a  p a r t i c l e  s t r i k i n g  a  component i n  the oxygen 
system a r e  no t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  c l e a r .  I g n i t i o n  o f  m a t e r i a l s  i n  l i nes ,  pumps, 
and valves have been a t t r i b u t e d  t o  p a r t i c l e  imp&cts. Methods f o r  p reven t i ng  
ignition by abras ion  o r  f r i c t i o n ,  a  cause est imated t o  have been respons ib le  
for a  number o f  mishaps, cannot be adequately def ined.  
Palvrneric m a t e r i a l s  have been recommended f o r  use i n  oxygen systems 
based on oxygen s e n s i t i v i t y  tes ts ,  b u t  these m a t e r i a l s  may s t i l l  p resent  
a s a f e t y  hazard i n  aerospace a p p l i c a t i o n s .  The p o l y t e t r a f l u o r o e t h y l e n e  
i n s u l a t i o n s  as w e l l  as many o f  the meta ls  used a re  p o t e n t i a l  f u e l s  and a l l  
r ha t  i s  r equ i red  is  an i g n i t i o n  source o f  s u f f i c i e n t  energy. T e f l o n  and o t h e r  
po lymer ic  m a t e r i a l s  may be p a r t i c u l a r l y  e f f i c i e n t  sources o f  i g n i t i o n  f o r  
a lu in inu rn  and o the r  meta ls  because the decomposit ion products  o f  the f l u o r i d e s  
tend  t o  remove t he  p r o t e c t i v e  ox ide  from these meta ls .  I n  add i t i on ,  the 
ecommended materials, when tested in oxygen-rich environments, may 
niting or self-extinguishing or slow burning, but the deconipositio 
y be toxic and present hazards to personnel. Toxic gases and va 
f incl ude carbonyl f 1 uor ide (coF~), carbon monoxide (co), formal deh 
e (HCH) and carbonyl chloride ( ~ 1 ~ ~ 0 ) .  Results of ther 
icity evaluations as a function of temperature for many of the po 
terials have been compiled by the Aerospace Corporation and' are sho 
Figure 4 (ref. 6). 
The thermal -decompos i t ion toxicity index I ,  a di rect measure 
hazard due to toxic product production, is defined as: 
where k is the rate constant for decomposition of the polymer (hi+-') 
the product i in ppm. 
The order of relative toxicity for the polymeric materials when h 
rom 500°F to 700°F shows Teflon TFE to be least toxic followed by Te 
FEP, polyimide film, Viton, perfluoropropylene polymer and carboxy nitr 
ints out the need for accident and fire protection to restrict burni 
material for the safety of the NASA manned missions. 
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SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although the  s o l u t i o n  t o  many of  t he  problems which caused the  oxygen 
mishaps cannot be s p e c i f i c a l l y  p resc r i bed  w i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  research and 
developme~nt e f f o r t s ,  severa l  p r a c t i c a l  sa fe ty  r e g u l a t i o n s  a re  recommended 
t o  increase t he  ope ra t i ona l  sa fe t y .  These recommendations based on s p e c i f i c  
mishaps i n  Appendix A i n c l ude  t he  f o l l o w i n g :  
(a) Prevent the  c ross  connect ing of  fue l ,  oxygen and purge l i n e s  by 
means o f  designs and pe rm i t  no subsequent u n c o n t r o l l e d  r e v i s i o n s  
by maintenance personnel.  
(b) S u i t a b l y  r e s t r a i n  a l l  f l e x i b l e  l i n e s  a t  s p e c i f i c  i n t e r v a l s .  
(c) Prevent the  ven t i ng  and d isposa l  of  oxygen near e l e c t r i c a l  
systems o r  o the r  i g n i t i o n  sources capable o f  i n i t i a t i n g  and 
promoting f i r e s .  
( d )  Prov ide c o n t r o l l e d  va l ve  ope ra t i on  o f  oxygen va lves  t o  l i m i t  
genera t ion  o f  hea t  due t o  gas compression. 
(e) Label pressure l i n e s  w i t h  va lues o f  ope ra t i ona l ,  proof ,  and 
des ign b u r s t  pressure. 
( f )  Conduct p re -opera t iona l  hazard analyses on l i q u i d  and gaseous 
pressure systems be fo re  checkout, ope ra t i on  o r  maintenance. 
(g) Insure v e r i f i c a t i o n  of pressure r e l i e f  before l i q u i d  and gas l i n e s  
a re  disconnected. 
(h) Emphasize hazards o f  opera t ions  i n  oxygen systems through t r a i n i n g .  
Many ope ra t i ng  personnel a r e  not  f u l l y  aware o f  the hazards assoc ia ted  
w i t h  oxygen systems. 
( i )  Main ta i n  records o f  any rework on tanks, l i n e s  and r e l a t e d  equip-  
ment. The opera t ions  performed should be a v a i l a b l e  t o  eva lua te  
con t inued  use o f  equipment. 
Fluids used should be identified and environment 
operations include a verification of the com~osit 
gas mixtures employed. 
Liquid oxygen loadi 
with duct and equipment fatigue c 
have been induced by low stress, high frequency 
by excessive fill rates. Instrumentation should 
measure and monitor induced vibrations. 
Standards should be 
to the oxygen systems. Problems of electrical arcing of 
l ights and fixtures should be resolved. 
Insure availability of recent information on results of t 
and of field experiences on the rnrnnatihil ; + \ I  -< --G--:-~ 
oxygen. 
DISCUSSION OF SELECTED MISHAPS 
he review of the reports indicates the mishaps are ca 
interacting factors. An effort was made in this paper to 
se as one of several basic deficiencies. In order to i l  
teraction of deficiencies responsible for each mishap, a m 
escription, than is presented in the Appendix A, is given f 
an oxygen regulator, the motor vehicle fire at the launch pa 
Apollo 13 flight misha~. 
u a - 
1. Failure of Oxygen Resuscitator 
During checkout of a 100% oxygen type resuscitator 
in the high pressure side of the resuscitator. 
~ s i g  oxygen and was being readied as 
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equipment f o r  launch f a c i l i t y  opera t ions .  The probable source o f  
the  f i r e  was t he  r e g u l a t o r  p r imary  seat made o f  ny lon.  I g n i t i o n  
was most l i k e l y  promoted by smal l  metal  p a r t i c l e s  which were found 
i n  t h e  system. A schematic diagram o f  t he  r e s u s c i t a t o r  r e g u l a t o r  i s  
shown i n  F igure  5 and a  photograph o f  the  rup tu red  s a f e t y  va l ve  i n  
F igure  6. A v iew i n t o  t he  r e g u l a t o r  body i l l u s t r a t i n g  the  burned 
p o r t i o n s  i s  shown i n  F igure  7. 
The mishap was caused by procedura l  d e f i c i e n c i e s  which d i d  no t  
p rov ide  s u f f i c i e n t  q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l ;  by the  use o f  incompat ib le  m a t e r i a l s  
and by system des ign l i m i t a t i o n s  r e s u l t i n g  i n  g a l l i n g  between t he  
s t a i n l e s s  s t e e l  i n l e t  va l ve  camshaft and aluminum housing. The g a l l i n g  
o f  the meta ls  was most l i k e l y  respons ib le  f o r  the metal  p a r t i c l e s  found 
i n  the  system. Redesign o f  the i n l e t  va l ve  camshaft assembly and the  
i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  a  f i l t e r  screen i n  the  r e g u l a t o r  a r e  minimum changes 
requ i red .  The va r i ous  rubber and p l a s t i c  s o f t  goods used i n  the 
r e g u l a t o r  a re  l i s t e d  i n  Table 1. With t h e  excep t ion  of t he  TFE T e f l o n  
on t he  r e g u l a t o r  i n l e t  va l ve  seat, a1 1 the  m a t e r i a l s  a r e  cons idered 
incompat ib le  w i t h  h i gh  pressure oxygen systems. 
A l though the acc iden t  occurred w i t h  a  p a r t i c u l a r  make r e s u s c i t a t o r ,  
an i nspec t i on  o f  oxygen r e s u s c i t a t o r s  and pure b r e a t h i n g  apparatus 
manufactured by o t h e r  f i r m s  was conducted. Resusc i ta to rs  manufactured 
by 5 f i rms  were examined and on the  bas i s  o f  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o r  non- 
a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  each i tem p r i m a r i l y  determined on da ta  conta ined i n  
NASA p u b l i c a t i o n ,  M a t e r i a l s  C o m p a t i b i l i t y  f o r  Gaseous Oxygen Systems 
( r e f .  7),  approx imate ly  50 t o  90% o f  the m a t e r i a l s  analyzed i n  each 
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11,000 ga l lons  and would be s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  a  gaseous oxygen volume 
t o  cover areas o f  roughly 5, 10 and 20 acres t o  a  depth o f  4 f t ,  a t  
concentrat  ions i n  100, 60 and 40% oxygen. 
Results o f  the i n v e s t i g a t i o n  ind ica ted  t h a t  two o f  the three 
veh ic les  caught f i r e  i n  the  engine compartment by a u t o i g n i t i o n  re -  
s u l t i n g  from engine heat, combustibles and enriched oxygen atmosphere. 
The other  veh i c le  apparent ly  i g n i t e d  as the  d r i v e r  attempted t o  s t a r t  
the engine. This veh i c le  was a l s o  i n  the oxygen enriched environment. 
A photograph showing the burned cars and t h e i r  pos i t i ons  w i t h  
respect t o  the fence and oxygen tank i s  shown i n  F igure 10. De ta i l  
comments from the o f f i c i a l  repo r t  on the accident  ( r e f .  8) concerning 
r e s u l t s  o f  the examination o f  each o f  the cars included the fo l l ow ing :  
Car No. 1 - Close-up Photograph Shown i n  F igure 1 1  
(a) The f i r e  was f i r s t  observed by the operator  i n  the engine 
compartment which upon examination ind ica ted  the most intense 
heat. It i s  bel ieved tha t  the po in t  o f  i g n i t i o n  occurred i n  
the engine compartment. 
(b) The d r i v e r  s ta ted  t h a t  veh i c le  had been operated f o r  a  s u f f i c i e n t  . 
t ime t o  be a t  normal opera t ing  temperature and t h a t  the veh ic le  
i g n i t i o n  had been o f f  f o r  approximately f i v e  minutes when f i r e  
, 
was f i r s t  not iced.  
(c) Normally, engine metal under the above cond i t ions  would a t t a i n  
an exhaust man i fo ld  temperature o f  above 600°F o r  above. Under- 
hood temperatures increase a f t e r  engine shutdown due t o  stoppage 
o f  the e n t i r e  coo l i ng  system. I t  i s  be l ieved tha t  the increased, 
o r  high, temperatures caused vapor i za t i on  of  gasol ine from the 

Car No. 3 - Close-up Photograph Shown i n  F igure  13 + 
- 
(a) Examination revealed tha t  the most intense heat was i n  the 
engine compartment. The evidence a v a i l a b l e  ind ica tes  tha t  
the f i r e  was f i r s t  no t iced i n  the  engine compartment. The 
p o i n t  o f  i g n i t i o n  i s  be l ieved t o  have occurred i n  the engine 
compartment . 
(b) D r i ve r  s ta ted  tha t  the veh ic le  was not  opera t ing  when the 
f i r e  was f i r s t  not iced, bu t  had been opera t ing  f o r  a s u f f i c i e n t  
t ime t o  reqch normal operat ing temperatures. 
(e) The underhood environment i s  considered s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  i n  Car 
No. 1 .  That is, h igh  temperatures and a r e l a t i v e l y  concentrated 
vapor i za t i on  o f  gasol ine from the carburetor  augmented by an 
oxygen saturated atmosphere, created an environment i n  which 
i g n i t i o n  could have occurred e i t h e r  by a u t o i g n i t i o n  o r  e l e c t r i c a l  
spark. 
Working o r  opera t ing  veh ic les  i n  oxygen clouds o r  oxygen enr iched 
environments i s  hazardous s ince i t  provides an increased p o t e n t i a l  f o r  
i g n i t i o n .  The minimum spark energy requ i red  f o r  i g n i t i o n ,  the f l a s h  
p o i n t  and the a u t o i g n i t i o n  temperature are  a l l  decreased. The de f i c i enc ies  
resporisible fo r  the accident included a combination o f  system design, 
procedural and t r a i n i n g  l i m i t a t i o n s .  The o v e r a l l  loading and dumping 
systems should inc lude methods of .:?rifying, t rack ing  and con t ro l  o f  
oxygen clouds. Procedures fo r  a l t e r n a t e  routes f o r  emergency veh ic les  
and f i r e  con t ro l  o f  personnel en t r y  i n t o  oxygen clouds should be 
prescribed. 
T)ae's'afcty t r a i n i n g  courses should i n c l u d e a d d i t i o n a l  informa- 
t i o n  t o  insure recogn i t i on  and safe p rac t i ces  concerning LOX vapor 
hazards. Safe operat ions i n  and around areas suspected of hairing LOX 
vapors should be o u t l i n e d  in the  sa fe ty  courses. 
Present o p e r a t i ~ n a l  p rac t i ces  inc lude vent ing  and dumping o f  
r e l a t i v e l y  Barge q u a n t i t i e s  o f  both oxygen and ni trogen, w i t h  the 
r e s u l t i n g  format ion o f  vapor clouds. These clouds whieh may accumulate 
and p e r s i s t  f o r  appreciable per iods o f  time, depending on atmosphere 
condi t ions,  c o n s t i t u t e  a s i g n i f i c a n t  hazard t o  personnel and equipment 
w i t h  which they come i n  contact.  Add i t i ona l  s tud ies  should be per-  
formed t o  permi t  assessment o f  the occurrence and p rope r t i es  o f  such 
clouds, the hazards associated w i t h  them and methods f o r  prevent ing 
o r  s a f e l y  opera t ing  i n  the presence o f  such clouds. 
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The Apo l l o  13 mishap was i n i t i a t e d  p r i m a r i l y  by the rup ture  of 
the oxygen tanks which suppl ied the fue l  c e l l s  and the breath ing  oxygen 
f o r  the cmmand module. The loss  o f  oxygen resu l ted  i n  the  loss  of the 
f u e l  c e l l  power. The cont ingencies designed i n t o  the  space vehic le,  
hmever, were s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  the lunar  miss ion crew t o  overcorne the 
emergency s i t u a t i o n  and use the a v a i l a b l e  l i f e  support systems t o  r e t u r n  
t o  a safe recovery. The d e t a i l e d  i nves t i ga t i ons  provided reasonable 
explanat ions f o r  the causes o f  the  mishap and d e t a i l s  o f  the i n t e r a c t i n g  
events Beading t o  the f i n a l  l oss  s f  power. Design l i m i t a t i o n s ,  ma te r i a l s  
i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s ,  q u a l i t y  con t ro l  (which includes inspection:) and 
procedural de f i c i enc ies  a l l  con t r ibu ted  t o  the mishap. 
A schematic showimg the  va r i ous  major systems o f  t he  Apo l lo /Sa tu rn  V 
launch v e h i c l e  i s  g i ven  i n  F i gu re  14. 
The oxygen and hydrogen tanks and f u e l  c e l l s  a r e  l oca ted  w i t h i n  t he  
s e r v i c e  module o f  t he  spacec ra f t .  The arrangements o f  t he  equipment a r e  
shown i n  F i gu re  15. The i n t e r n a l  components i n  t he  oxygen tank  a re  shown 
i n  F i gu re  16, Two hea te r s  i n  each tank  supply  t he  heat  necessary t o  main- 
t a i n  the  des ign  p ressure  i n  t he  oxygen tank.  Fans c i r c u l a t e  t he  oxygen 
over  t h e  h e a t i n g  elements t o  reduce any s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  p resen t  i n  t he  
s u p e r c r i t i c a l  oxygen. 
The da ta  ob ta ined  d u r i n g  t h e  f l i g h t  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  a  problem arose i n  
t he  oxygen t ank  (No. 2) when t he  e l e c t r i c a l  f a n  c i r c u i t s  were a c t i v a t e d .  
Several sho r t  c i r c u i t s  were de tec ted  which were i s o l a t e d  t o  t he  f a n  c i r c u i t s  
o f  t he  tank.  The s h o r t  c i r c u i t  cou ld  have con ta ined  as much as 160 j o u l e s  
o f  energy and t e s t s  have shown t h a t  t h i s  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  energy t o  i g n i t e  
t he  p o l y t e t r a f l u o r o e t h y l e n e  ( ~ e f l o n )  i n s u l a t i o n  on the  f a n  c i r c u i t  w i r e s  
submerged i n  t he  oxygen. 
The w i r i n g  c o n d u i t  which con ta ined  t h e  power leads f o r  t h e  f a n  motors 
and hea te r s  and t he  ins t rument  leads a re  f e d  through t he  vacuum s h e l l  i n  a  
he rme t i c  seal  which a r e  then passed i n t o  the  oxygen vessel  through about 
1/2 inch  d iameter  t ub i ng .  F igures  17 and 18 show t h e  oxygen tank  w i r i n g  
and l i n e s ,  The 1/2 inch d iameter  t u b i n g  c o n t a i n i n g  t h e  w i r i n g  was formed 
i n t o  a  10 inch  c o i l  w i t h  about 3 t u rns .  The i n t e r i o r  o f  t h e  condu i t  i s  
open t o  t h e  p ressu r i zed  oxygen t o  the  p o i n t  o f  t h e  hermet i c  sea ls .  
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The i n s u l a t i o n  on the power wires may have become abraded due t o  
v i b r a t i o n  of the condui t  and the rubbing o f  the w i res  against  each o ther .  
The method o f  assembling leads i n t o  the condui t  may have introduced s t r a i n s  
i n t o  the w i res  causing increased i n s u l a t i o n  wear. These cond i t ions  could 
then lead t o  s i t u a t i o n s  where s u f f i c i e n t  energy, produced by sho r t i ng  
power leads, could i g n i t e  the surrounding Tef lon.  Most probably, the 
Tef lon  i n s u l a t i o n  f i r e  progressed i n t o  the e l e c t r i c a l  condui t  t ub ing  a t  
the top  of the  tank,opening the tank t o  the serv ice  bay, With the burn- 
through o f  the conduit ,  the pressure increased i n  the bay r e s u l t i n g  i n  
separat ion o f  the panel which enclosed the  bay, The panel separat ion 
from the bay probably caused s u f f i c i e n t  shock t o  c lose  the oxygen supply 
valves. I n  a l l  l i k e l i h o o d ,  the oxygen system ( i n  tank 1 )  developed a l e a k  
e i t h e r  as a r e s u l t  o f  the shock when the panel separated o r  from the 
dynamics o f  the events associated w i t h  the  f a i l u r e  o f  the tank 2 e l e c t r i c a l  
condui t .  A photograph of  the oxygen tank i n  the serv ice  module bay i s  
shown i n  F igure 19. 
I nves t i ga t i ons  o f  the opera t ing  and t e s t i n g  procedures conducted on the 
oxygen tank ind ica ted  t h a t  du r ing  the countdown demonstrat ion tes ts ,  an 
oxygen detanking problem arose which had a p a r t  i n  the  anomaly. The 
normal procedure f o r  detanking o f  the oxygen, a f t e r  the load ing  demonstration, 
could not be accomplished and the method employed was t o  b o i l  the f l u i d  
through the use o f  the tank heaters and fans. I t  was thought t h a t  no 
damage would be susta ined by the tank o r  i t s  components because i n t e r n a l  
thermal switches prov ided p ro tec t i on ,  Thermal s e n s i t i v e  i n t e r l o c k  devices 
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were connected i n  s e r i e s  w i t h  each o f  the  h e a t i n g  elements t o  avo id  
excess ive temperatures.  The hea te r  c i r c u i t  would be a u t o m a t i c a l l y  
opened when the  i n t e r n a l  hea te r  tube w a l l  temperature reached 90°F and 
c losed  a t  70°F, The use o f  t h e  hea te r s  t o  a s s i s t  i n  de tank ing  r e q u i r e d  
a  manual mode o f  o p e r a t i o n  which r e s u l t e d  i n  the  swi tches opening under 
a  load a t  t w i c e  t he  normal o p e r a t i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  each hea te r .  Tests  
showed t h a t  opening t he  swi tches under these c o n d i t i o n s  would fuse  t h e  
con tac t s  c l osed  a t  t he  i n s t a n t  o f  power i n t e r r u p t i o n .  Tests  have v e r i f i e d  
t h a t  w i t h  t he  hea te r  on, f o r  t h e  d u r a t i o n  exper ienced d u r i n g  pre launch 
opera t ions ,  f a n  motor w i r e  i n s u l a t i o n  would be seve re l y  degraded. A  
photograph of t h e  f a n  motor w i r e  damage f rom s imu la ted  hea te r  t e s t s  i s  
shown i n  F i gu re  20. A  fused thermal sw i t ch  c o n t r o l  ob ta i ned  under 
s imu la ted  t e s t s  i s  shown i n  F i gu re  21. 
S tud ies  o f  such mishaps (and e s p e c i a l l y  u s i n g  s i m u l a t i o n s  o f  a c t u a l  
occurrences)  p rov i de  no t  o n l y  t he  p o s i t i v e  c o r r e c t i v e  ac t ions ,  which 
reduce t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  such mishaps i n  s i m i l a r  launch v e h i c l e  systems 
bu t  a l s o  i n d i c a t e  areas f o r  improved s a f e t y  des igns and ope ra t i ons  f o r  
systems u s i n g  t he  same p r o p e l l a n t s .  Problems r e q u i r i n g  a d d i t i o n a l  s tud ies,  
research and development a re  a l s o  i d e n t i f i e d .  
Examples o f  t h e  a c t i o n s  taken by NASA r e s u l t i n g  f rom t h i s  mishap i n -  
c luded  no t  o n l y  a  rev iew and a n a l y s i s  o f  a l l  oxygen systems i n  A p o l l o  bu t  
a  renewed awareness o f  t h e  c r i t i c a l i t y  o f  meta ls  and m a t e r i a l s  combined 
w i t h  h e a t / i g n i t i o n  sources i n  oxygen systems. A number o f  s p e c i f i c  des ign  
changes and cont ingency ope ra t i ons  i n i t i a t e d  inc luded  t he  f o l l o w i n g  
( r e f s .  9, 10): 
(a) Redesign and replacement of 0 tanks, and supply syst:ems in 2 
the service module, 
(b) Provision of additional battery power for backup operation of 
the command service module. 
(c) Review and refinement of Apollo systems for contingency opera- 
tion and contingency plans. 
(d) Review and analysis of a1 1 1 iqu id oxygen systems in Up01 1 o 
and other systems. 
(e) Review and analysis by a1 1 NASA agencies for hazards and un- 
identified deficiencies in all ground based as well as flight 
systems using LOX and other oxidizer. 
(f) Renewed awareness of the criticality of metals and materials 
combined with heat/ignition sources in oxygen systems. 
(g) Increased review of anomal ies when they occur. 
(h) Closer quality control contacts to be maintained with vendors, 
subcontractors and suppliers. 
CONCLUD l NG REMARKS 
The NASA recognizes that some of the reports prepared do not contain 
sufficiently detailed technical descriptions of the mishaps or are not specific 
as to the hardware and/or operating procedures involved with causes of the mis- 
haps. Efforts are presently under way to investigate methods of modifying the 
reporting procedures to include such information. The reporting requirements 
will also include more detailed explanations of the corrective actions that 
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a re  recommendesd f o r  t h e  con t inued  use o f  t h e  system. The i n c l u s i o n  o f  
d e t a i l e d  c o s t  es t imates  o f  the  mishaps would be o f  cons ide rab le  ass i s t ance  
i n  p r o v i d i n g  management w i t h  needed i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  r i s k  manage- 
ment p reven t i on  programs. 
The c o m p i l a t i o n  and rev iew o f  mishaps w i t h  oxygen presented i n  t h e  Appendix 
A and t he  b r i e f  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  the  i n t e r a c t i n g  e f f e c t s  r espons ib l e  f o r  severa l  
o f  the  mishaps emphasize some o f  t h e  problems t o  be so lved  and p rov i de  bas i c  
i npu t s  toward e s t a b l i s h i n g  adequate f l i g h t  sa fe t y  systems. Such s t u d i e s  a r e  
necessary t o  determine t he  p o t e n t i a l  hazards assoc ia ted  w i t h  oxygen, a s s i s t  
i n  t he  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  such p o t e n t i a l  hazards, and f i n a l l y  h e l p  
i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  p reven t i ve  and remedial  measures, 
APPENDIX A 
LOX CRYOGEN l C SYSTEMS 
L i q u i d  Oxygen Acc idents / lnc idents  
A va lve  design d 
leak ing  LOX va lve and i 
Ma te r i a l s  incompat ib i l  
procedures and t r a i n i n g  
mproper l u b r i c a n t  on the LOX unauthor ized l u b r i c a n t s  
Mate r ia l  f a i l u r e  i n  t 
p l a t e  f a i l e d  from f a t  
dumped i n t o  the  t e s t  a r  
housekeeping i n  the t e s t  
g  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  t e s t  o f  a  LOX A pump design d e f i c i e n  
pump f o r  a  booster engine, inadequate clearances 
ump exploded on the 33rd s t a r t .  and the s l  inger and be 
the backpla te  r e s u l t i n g  i n  
~ g h  frequency v i b r a t i o n  Mate r ia l  f a i l u r e  induced b 
frequency v  i b r a t  ions cause 
f i l l  ra tes.  A f a s t  f l o w  r 
near ing completion. Engineering 
performed a f a t i g u e  ana lys is  t o  d 
an optimum f i l l  r a te .  
The t r a n s f e r  procedure was s i g  
"valve closed" bu t  i t  a c t u a l l y  
The bleed va lve was open, as i 
t r ans fe r  operat ions were t o  a l l ow  bleed o f f  o f  res idua l  
the tank t o  d r a i n  through the t 
A pressure d i f f e r e n t i a l  caused b 
b u i l d  up i n  the LOX system w h i l e  
had been closed f o r  110 minut 
Accident / lnc ident  Desc r i p t i on  Causes 
8. An explos ion of a  LOX conta iner  Noncompatible l u b r i c a n t s  used and inadequate 
occurred when the va lve  was opened. work con t ro l  procedures t o  perform inspect ion 
o f  LOX i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  
9 .  An explos ion occurred i n  a  LOX system Def i c iency  i n  work con t ro l  procedures and 
when i t  was inadver tent1 y  over-  inadequate i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  b leed plugs. 
pressur ized due t o  i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  Contr i but  ing was inadequate inspect ion  o f  
improper bleed plugs i n  a  pressure t e s t  i n s t a l l a t i o n .  
regu la to r .  
10. Dur ing t r ans fe r  o f  LOX from tanker 
t o  tanker, the main va lve mal- 
funct ioned resu l  t i  ng i n  dumping o f  
3200 ga l lons  o f  LOX on the  ramp. 
1 1 .  Dur ing de- fue l ing  operat ions a f t e r  a  
tes t ,  a  f i r e  occurred a t  the vent 
when LOX was i g n i t e d  by an e l e c t r i c a l  
shor t  du r ing  vlenting. 
12. A major LOX s p i l l  (26,000 gal.) 
occurred a t  a  t e s t  stand du r i ng  
secur ing operat ions f o l l o w i n g  a t e s t .  
The tank va lve was l e f t  open dur ing  
a lunch per iod  a f t e r  the p i p i n g  
system d r a i n  was opened. 
13. During a human f a c t o r s  ana lys is  o f  a  
stage f u e l  system, a  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  
cross-connect ing the f ue l  t e s t  1 ine 
f l e x  hose and the LOX sensing f l e x  
hose was discovered. Cor rec t i ve  
a c t i o n  prevented such an event, 
however the p o t e n t i a l  f o r  a  major 
exp los ion ex is ted .  
14, Apo l lo  S C  204 f i r e .  F i r e  i n  Apo l lo  
command module on launch pad resu l t ed  
i n  f a t a l i t i e s  aind extens ive damage. 
Atmosphere - 100% O2 a t  approximately 
16 ps ia .  F i r e  was propagated t h r u  
spacecraf t  by ma te r i a l s  which were 
very flammable i n  100% 0 as compared 
t o  a i r .  2  
The l i q u i d  con t ro l  va lve  design f o r  the 
pressure bu i ld -up  c o i l  was d e f i c i e n t .  I t  was 
jammed by a p iece o f  aluminum which apparent ly  
came from one o f  the b a f f l e s  i n  the tank. 
Tank and system design d e f i c i e n c i e s  con- 
t r i b u t e d  t o  the  acc ident .  
A design de f i c iency  i n  the t e s t  i n s t a l l a t i o n  
i n  t h a t  the LOX vent was located i n  a manner 
i n  which vapors were emi t ted  i n  the area o f  
e l e c t r i c a l  w i r i n g .  
System was maintained i n  operat iona l  mode 
a f t e r  the  t e s t  due t o  planned t e s t  of t he  
turbopurnps. Subsequently, a  dec is ion  was made 
t o  secure. The techn ic ian  went through normal 
d r a i n i n g  operat ions t h a t  would be done w i t h  
the tank va lve  c losed and d i d  no t  c lose  the 
tank va lve.  There was no v e r i f i c a t i o n  pro-  
cedure i n  e f f e c t  f o r  valves.  
L ines had been designed i n  assembl ies  o f  
f l e x  l i n e s  o f  the same length and s i ze  which 
included bo th  f ue l  and LOX l i n e s .  The l i n e s  
were not  c o l o r  coded and were o f  the same 
length,  p e r m i t t i n g  cross-connection. 
The probable source o f  i g n i t i o n  was associated. 
w i t h  the spacecraf t  w i r i ng .  The r e s u l t s  o f  
the i n v e s t i g a t i o n  concluded the d e f i c i e n c i e s  
which l ed  t o  the  d i sas te r  included inadequate 
work procedures, use ofnoncompatible 
mater i  a1 s  and inadequate system designs. 
These cond i t i ons  included (a) a  pressur ized 
oxygen atmosphere i n  the  sealed cabin; (b) 
la rge  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  combust ib le ma te r i a l s  i n  
the  cabin; (c) w i r i n g  and plumbing located i n  
hazardous loca t ions ;  (d) inadequate escape and 
rescue p rov is ions  f o r  the crew. 
Acc ident / lnc ident  Desc r ip t i on  Causes 
pera t iona l  t e s t i n g  o f  a  A  design de f i c i ency  i n  t 
r a t o r  LOX i n j e c t o r  l i n e s  were no t  p rope r l y  
cross-connected s i m i l a r  s i z e  and design. 
mber i n j e c t o r  t o  the e r r o r  on the p a r t  
rge f l e x  l i n e  on an engine. This  personnel who cross-conne 
n a t i o n  o f  t he  f l e x  Con t r i bu t i ng  causes were 
ome. No i n j u r y  t o  uncomfortable posture wh 
l ines,  w i t h  l i g h t i n g  t h a t  i 
and cramped f o r  space t o  us 
i v a t i o n  t e s t  o f  an I g n i t i o n  apparent ly  occu 
Fac i 1 i ty, a  LOX contaminat ion i n  the l i n  
LOX was turned on Piece o f  impe l le r  betwee 
opera t ion  and impel ler .  Shock o f  impa 
t o  a  f a c i l  i t y  Inboard t h r u s t  bear ing f 
p  and p ip ing ,  LOX pressure generated s u f f i c i e n t  ene 
-600 ps i, pump d r i v e n  by 250 HP The pump design was not  
f a i l u r e  and the i n s t a l l a t i o n  and 
procedures were notadequate t o  p re  
taminat ion. A1  so purge an~d 
cedures were not  s a t i s f a c t  
u l a t i o n  t e s t  o f  a  A design de f i c i ency  i n  u s i n  
ooster  stage, a  p iece of Buna rubber ma te r i a l  s  (Buna rubber) 
roke o f f  the LOX feed va lve  and Con t r i bu t i ng  cause was f 
aused impact i g n i t i o n  when i t  s t ruck  in fo rmat ion  from a  p r e v i  
he pump impel ler ,  des t roy ing  the  p iece o f  Buna rubber was f 
980 psig, d r i v e n  discharge screen. Valve 
w i t h  LOX. 
ion  t e s t  i nvo l v ing  F a i l u r e  t o  proof  t e s t  the tan 
emperature count- rework. Con t r i bu t i ng  ca 
e  c e r t a i n  capab i l -  workmanship i n  t he  weld! 
a t i on ,  a  LOX tank inspect ion  o f  welds. Co 
tu red  and scat te red  throughout r e p a i r s  o r  mod i f i ca t i ons  was not  
area. Occurred on seventh 
sure reached 77 
79 p s i g  tes t .  No 
rsonnel were in ju red .  
r i n g  pneumatic c o n t r o l  subsystem installation e r r o r  caused by iden 
eckout, a  LOX ch i l l down  pump housing and j o i n t s  located together  i n  a 
as i nadve r ten t l y  overpressur ized and p e r t ~ ~ i t t e d  cross-connection. The p  
ad t o  be replaced when two adjacent t o  the ch i l l down  pump was connecte 
e  cross-connected. s h u t o f f  va lve  p ip ing .  A c o n t r i b u t  
t o  the accident  was a  design d e f i c  
not  l o c a t i n g  pipes so they could n  
connected o r  s i z i n g  o r  keying t o  p r  
cross-connection. 
Acc iden t / lnc iden t  Desc r i p t i on  
20. Dur ing unloading of  LOX from r a i l  
car t o  sphere, a  LOX s p i l l  occurred 
when f i l l  hose was disconnected. 
Two men were exposed t o  LOX. 
During countdown f o r  s t a t i c  f i r i n g ,  
a  leak occurred a t  12th l eve l  i n  
the LOX f i l l  and d r a i n  1 ines. The 
topping opera t ion  was d iscont inued 
f o r  assessment bu t  a  dangerous 
cond i t i on  r esu l t ed  when an excessive 
number o f  people were al lowed i n  the 
area dur ing  t h i s  emergency. 
22. A LOX system exploded dur ing  a s t a t i c  
F i r i n g  due t o  c lean ing f l u i d  co r ros ion  
i n  the system. 
23. A LOX system caught f i r e  and exploded 
due t o  the use of hydro-carbon 
l ub r i can t s  on connections. 
24. A t i t an i um sphere used i n  a  LOX 
system exploded and burned causing 
ser ious system damage. 
25. A LOX system was contaminated by use 
o f  incompat ib le ink  used f o r  i n t e rna l  
stamping dur ing  manufacture o f  
components, causing complete ana lys is  
o f  system and c leaning o f  components 
t o  he performed. 
26. E l e c t r i c a l  w i r i n g  and plumbing were 
darnaged i n  a  t e s t  set  up when 
e l e c t r i c a l  w i r i n g  near an oxygen 
p i g  t a i l  vent shorted and i g n i t e d  
t h e  oxygen. 
Causes 
F a i l u r e  t o  a l l o w  s u f f i c i e n t  b o i l  o f f  t ime 
p r i o r  t o  d isconnect ing f i l l l i n e .  Con t r ibu t ing  
cause was l a c k  o f  s p e c i f i c  i n s t r u c t i o n s  f o r  
b o i l  o f f  t imes of d i f f e r e n t  types o f  cars.  
Mate r ia l  f a i l u r e  of the LOX hoses, causing 
cracks. Con t r ibu t ing  t o  the p o t e n t i a l l y  
hazardous c o n d i t i o n  was inadequate con t ro l  
over en t r y  o f  personnel t o  t he  area dur ing  
an emergency. 
Noncanpatible c lean ing f l u i d s  were used and 
p e r i o d i c  inspec t ion  f o r  co r ros ion  was not 
accompl i shed. 
F a i l u r e  t o  spec i f y  compatible l ub r i can t s  f o r  
use on oxygen system. 
Design de f i c i ency  i n  us ing a t i t an i um 
sphere i n  a  LOX system. Ti tanium i s  no t  
canpa t ib le  w i t h  LOX. 
A c lean ing procedural de f i c iency  i n  
manufacturing. Ac t i on  had no t  been taken 
t o  determine compat ib i l  i t y  o f  the ink  w i t h  
LOX p r i o r  t o  spec i f y i ng  i t s  use. 
A design de f i c iency  i n  the t e s t  i n s t a l l a t i o n .  
The p i g t a i  1 vent was located i n  such a 
manner t h a t  i t  vented d i r e c t l y  t o  adjacent 
w i r e  bundles. Con t r ibu t ing  was a pro-  
cedural e r r o r  i n  con t inu ing  the t e s t  w i t h  a 
leak ing  LOX va lve  which resu l t ed  i n  the 
ven t ing  and the  f i r e .  
nd LOX rep1 en i shment . 
ainst aluminum plate 
compatibility, desig 
equate cleanliness a 
ilure o f  the flexible 
Acc iden t / lnc iden t  Desc r i p t i on  
31. Dur ing a  LOX manual load ing tes t ,  
the corrugated f lex-hose assembly 
located between the manual and 
remote operated pump suct  ion va lve  
ruptured immediately a f t e r  the 
va lve was opened. Wire mesh b ra  i d  
f a i l e d  which i l l lowed the pressure 
i n  the 1 ine t o  extend the  f l e x  hose 
u n t i l  the weld a t  the end o f  the 
cor rugat ions f a i l e d .  Tw i s t i ng  
moments exer ted on the l i n e  and 
va lve  caused separat ion and move- 
ment of the system and p u l l e d  
loose a  p ipe support. 800,000 
gal 9 ons o f  LOX was sp i l 1 ed and the 
tank was p a r t i a l l y  co l lapsed from 
vacuum. The seal bel lows which 
connected the inner sphere re1 i e f  
va lve s tando f f  t o  the  ou te r  s h e l l  
col lapsed. The carbon s tee l  pump 
baseplate was cracked. 
3 2 .  A LOX-RP-4 t e s t  veh i c l e  was 
destroyed by f i r e  and exp los ion.  
I n i t i a l  t e s t i n g  ind ica ted  some 
d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  LOX feed system and 
the LOX pump i n l e t  f lange and i n l e t  
assembly showed eros ion and m e t a l l i c  
deposi ts.  
3 3 .  During p repara t ion  f o r  a  stage engine 
LOX dome f l u s h  procedure, the h i gh  
pressure GN f a c i l i t y  va lve  was 2 
opened t o  p ressur i ze  the tank w i t h  
regula ted 500 p s i g  and simultaneously 
regula ted 500 p s i g  GN2 was i n t r o -  
duced as back-pressure on a  sp r ing  
loaded vent va lve on the tank. The 
vent va lve blew out when the regu la to r  
supply ing back-pressure s t a b i l i z e d  a t  
2100 p s i g  ins tead of 500 ps ig .  NO 
personnel i n j u r i e s ,  however the  vent 
va lve  was destroyed. 
6 
Causes 
A design de f i c i ency  i n  the main pump suc t i on  
va lve  and inpu t  l i n e s  permi t ted  trapped a i r  
i n  the l i n e  t o  escape when the va lve opened 
causing a  r a p i d  acce le ra t i on  i n  the f l o w  
o f  l i q u i d .  The l i q u i d  reached the va lve  
p r i o r  t o  ach iev ing i t s  f u l l y  open pos i t i on .  
The l i q u i d  hammer e f f e c t  fo rced  the va lve 
t o  a  c losed p o s i t i o n  causing excessive 
tens ion  on the hose. The use o f  a f l e x  hose 
upstream of  the va lve  i s  i n d i c a t i v e  of an un- 
acceptable design. The inner  sphere 
co l lapsed due t o  the negat ive pressure s ince 
the l i q u i d  f low could  not  be terminated. The 
r e l a t i v e  l o c a t i o n  o f  the v a l v i n g  was no t  
designed t o  permi t  te rm ina t ion  o f  the f low.  
Design changes should inc lude supports on 
e i t h e r  s ide  o f  the remote opera t ing  valves 
and a  remotely operated system t o  feed LOX 
i n t o  l i n e  upstream o f  valve.  The system 
design was a l s o  d e f i c i e n t  i n  no t  p rov i d i ng  
vacuum r e l i e f  devices t o  prevent u l l a g e  
pressure o f  inner sphere t o  reach below 
atmospheric pressure. 
I g n i t i o n  o f  oxygen and pump p a r t s  was probably 
caused by heat due t o  f r i c t i o n  produced by 
rubbing between impe l le r  and wear r i n g  
d i v e r t e r  l i p .  Excessive p i t t i n g  was evidenced 
on inner sur face o f  vo l u te .  The p i t s  contained 
f o r e i g n  ma te r i a l  1 i k e  sand and chromic ac id .  
Drop le ts  o f  aluminum a l l o y  found on wear r i n g .  
Design d e f i c i e n c i e s  and contaminat ion i n  the 
l i n e  and pump pa r t s  con t r i bu ted  t o  the accident.  
System design s tud ies  and a  hazards ana lys is  
o f  the  f a c i l i t y  i n s t a l l a t i o n  and f l u s h  
procedure, which would have detected the need 
f o r  r e l i e f  c a p a b i l i t y  i n  the system, were no t  
performed. Con t r ibu t ing  was the f a i l u r e  o f  
f a c i l i t y  i nspec t ion  t o  de tec t  the absence 
o f  r e l i e f  c a p a b i l i t y  as spec i f i ed  i n  con- 
s t r u c t i o n / i n s t a l l a t i o n  drawings. 
ex hose from the pressure 
kout and c a l i b r a t i o n  panel o f  a  
t e r  manufactur ing tower was used 
c t i v a t e  a  stage LOX preva lve t o  
osed p o s i t i o n  so t h a t  i n s t a l  l a -  
of a  LOX low pressure duct  cou ld  
erformed. Second s h i f t  manufac- 
Ing personnel unaware o f  the f l e x  
ose i n s t a l l a t i o n ,  pressur ized the 
anel t o  100 p s i  f o r  engine purge 
pera t ions  on another veh i c l e  and con- 
e n t l y  the preva lve ac tua to r  was 
ected t o  approximately tw ice  i t s  
a t  ing pressure. 
heck t e s t s  on a  LOX valve, 
ntenance and cleaning, 
r y  pressure o f  approximately 
0 p s i  was app l ied  through an un- 
ured f l e x  1 ine causing i t  t o  snap 
i n  so doing, f o r c i n g  the va lve 
n  an unmounted v i s e  o f f  the tab le .  
No personnel i n j u r i e s .  
c lean ing  o f  a  5000 ga l .  oxygen 
s ing  t r i ch l o roe thy l ene ,  a  f l a s h  
occurred i n  the tank when a  p iece 
a s t i c  f e l l  i n t o  the  tank and onto 
ea te r  element rod. One man 
ved minor i n j u r y .  
u r i n q  f ue l  c e l l  p ressu r i za t i on  o f  a  
f l  i g h t  veh i c l e  the  O2 system was 
ressur ized t o  25% above design 
, when 3 new "KI1 b o t t l e  pressure 
urce was added. Although no damage 
curred, the system could  have been 
u r i n g  t h i r d  acceptance t e s t  o f  a  
s t e r  engine, a  turbopump f i r e  
u r red  as a  r e s u l t  o f  LOX leakage 
the pump gear box. There was 
ns ive  damage t o  the  engine and 
i no r  damage t o  the  f a c i  1 i t y .  
Causes 
I n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  the f l e x  
documentation o r  procedur 
and f a i l u r e  t o  pass i n f o r  
s h i f t  t o  another as t o  the pa 
were the causes of the acc ident ,  
The f l e x  hose used was of  excessive length 
and was not  res t ra ined .  The t e s t  a r t i c l e  
was no t  p roper l y  secured 
t e s t  procedures were no t  
was no inspec t ion  v e r i f i  
setup. 
Procedural de f i c i ency  i n  
adequate c o n t r o l  o f  the 
c lean ing  operat ions,  t o  
"Housekeeping1' was margin 
inspec t ion  lax .  
F a i l u r e  t o  c lose  regu la t  
r egu la to r  va lve  on the 'I 
been opened as the supply was depl 
the new "Kit b o t t l e  was added, the  
va lve  was not  reclosed, a l l ow ing  
o f  2200 ps i g  t o  be appl i ed  t o  a  350 
sys tem. 
Acc iden t / lnc iden t  Desc r i p t i on  
39. Dur ing a  labioratory t e s t  f o r  qua1 i f i c a -  
t i o n  o f  a  LOX preva lve f o r  engine 
shutdown of a booster engine, the t e s t  
system exploded t en  seconds a f t e r  
i n i t i a t i o n ,  des t roy ing  the valve,  and 
damaging the t e s t  f a c i l i t y  and the 
t e s t  engine. 
40, During s t a t i c  f i r i n g  t es t ,  a  f u e l  
leak occurred and resu l t ed  i n  a  f i r e  
which burned through measurement w i res  
causing t e s t  shutdown. Conf igurat ion 
o f  the LOX system f o l  lowing shutdown 
caused rup tu re  o f  a  LOX in terconnect  
l i n e  and approximately 50,000 gals.  
f lowed i n t o  the stage t h r u s t  s t r u c t u r e  
and on engines. F i r e  damaged engine 
harnesses and hardware. 
41. Dur ing LOX tank repa i r ,  an e l e c t r i c  
heater  b lanket  was i n s t a l l e d  on the 
LOX f i l t e r  u n i t  t o  prov ide heat ins ide  
the tank. The b lanke t  overheated and 
the stage LOX tank caught f i r e ,  
causing extens ive damage. 
42. A t h r u s t  chamber purge was inadver-  
t e n t l y  appl ied t o  a  stage w i t hou t  
the LOX dome purge being "on" resu 1 t - 
ing i n  contaminat ion o f  the LOX system 
and b lowing o f f  o f  engine e x i t  covers. 
Causes 
A design de f i c i ency  i n  t h a t  the pump 
devel oped an uneven two-phase f 1 ow and 
c a v i t a t i o n  a f t e r  c l o s i n g  o f  the LOX prevalve.  
Th i s  f 1 ow cond i t  ion  caused uneven 1 oads on th.e 
impe l le r  and u l t i m a t e  f a i l u r e .  
A  po lyethy lene sh ipp ing d i s c  had no t  been 
removed from a  f ue l  connect ion and caused 
the fuel  leak.  Con t r i bu t i ng  causes were 
design de f i c i enc i es  i n  the sh ipp ing d i s c  such 
t h a t  i t  was no t  p roper l y  co l o r  coded o r  
i d e n t i f i e d  as a  sh ipp ing d i s c  and was no t  s ized 
o r  conf igured t o  prevent inadver tent  i n s t a l l a -  
t i o n  on t he  opera t ing  system. Test termina- 
t ion r esu l t ed  i n  the c l o s i n g  of the  oxygen pre-  
va lves.  With the  c l o s i n g  o f  the prevalves, 
the LOX in te rconnec t ing  valves opened auto- 
m a t i c a l l y  a l l ow ing  "hot LOX" t o  escape i n t o  the 
suc t i on  l i nes .  Th is  r esu l t ed  i n  geyser ing 
i n  the  LOX feed system. 
A m o d i f i c a t i o n  had been made t o  i n s t a l l  the 
heater  b lanket  w i t hou t  a formal engineer ing 
work order, w i t hou t  a  hazard ana lys is  and 
w i t hou t  sa fe t y  approval. The i n s t a l  1 a t  ion o f  
the 220V AC b lanke t  was made t o  a  4 4 0 ~  AC l ine.  
No temperature con t ro l  devices were provided 
on the b lanke t .  
An erroneous v e r i f i c a t i o n  t o  the operator  
t h a t  the  RP-1 fue l  s imu la to r  had been 
i n s t a l l e d .  Con t r ibu t ing  cause was an 
engineer ing de f i c iency  i n  no t  prepar ing an 
engineer ing order  change r e q u i r i n g  the 
i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  the  s imulator .  
The main stage exploded dur ing  f i n a l  Two redundant LOX vent valves f a i l e d  t o  
countdown phase o f  s t a t i c  f i r i n g ,  re lease due t o  presence of s o l i d  oxygen. 
des t roy ing  the stage and causing So l ids  formed due t o  the use o f  co l d  he l ium 
major damage t o  the f a c i l  i t y .  Ex- gas f o r  p ressu r i za t i on  from tanks located 
p l os i on  caused by r up tu re  o f  stage w i t h i n  the 1 i q u i d  hydrogen f ue l  tank. 
LOX tank. Normally the  hel ium passes through heater 
berore en te r i ng  LOX tank. Con t r ibu t ing  causes 
were f a i l u r e  t o  f o l l o w  approved procedures 
and an unsa t i s fac to ry  heliurn shu t -o f f  va lve 
dur ing  co ld  cond i t i ons .  Test p repara t ion  was 
inadequate i n  t h a t  a  number o f  valves were over-  
looked dur ing  p r e t e s t  checks and were not  i n  the  
proper p o s i t i o n .  
Acc iden t / lnc iden t  Descr ip t ion  Causes 
44. Dur ing inspec t ion  of a  stage LOX The c lean ing  and inspec t ion  operat ions were 
tank, a  p b s t i c  con ta iner  and c leaning inadequate. Procedures f o r  work con t ro l  
pads were found i n  the screens and du r i ng  the i n s t a l l a t i o n  were d e f i c i e n t ,  
bottom o f  t he  tank. 
45. Dur ing removal o f  the  oxygen s h e l f  The cause of acc ident  was due t o  both pro-  
from a spacecraf t ,  the s h e l f  was cedural and design de f i c i enc i es .  The p roo f  
damaged when a weld f a i l u r e  occurred load ing requirements was author ized w i thou t  
on an i n s t a l l a t i o n  adapter. f o l l o w i n g  the prescr ibed procedures, I n  
add i t ion ,  the hand l ing  equipment was designed 
f o r  a  s h e l f  weight approximately 90 Ibs ,  l ess  
than the ac tua l  s h e l f  weight.  
46. Dur ing development t e s t s  o f  LH2-LO2 There was an excess i ve  l eve l  o f  oxygen i n  
the LH tank vent l ine and a f l a s h  back from 
stage an exp los ion destroyed the 2 
booster stage a f t e r  being loaded w i t h  the burn s tack a t  the  end of the  tank vent 
p rope l lan ts .  The exp los ion took p lace l i n e  i n i t i a t e d  the exp los ion.  The procedures 
j u s t  p r i o r  t o  the  s t a t i c  f i r i n g .  f o r  i n e r t i n g  the LH2 tank were inadequate 
47. Dur ing development t e s t i n g  of a  LOX- 
RP f u e l  stage engine an exp los ion  
occurred i n  the open a i r  a t  the t e s t  
f a c i l i t y .  The exp los ion  caused 
extens ive damage t o  the  t e s t  stand. 
48. Dur ing t e s t i n g  o f  LOX-LH2 engine, a  
leak  i n  the oxygen system and f i r e  
caused extens ive damage t o  t h e t e s t  
stand, 1 i q u i d  oxygen system, t h r u s t  
chamber p rope l l an t  va lves and o ther  
f l  i gh t  hardware. Accident occurred 
du r i ng  i n i t i a l  t e s t i n g  o f  systems. 
p e r m i t t i n g  a  dangerous oxygen concen t ra t ion  
t o  be present. The system design was d e f i c i e n t  
i n  not  p rov i d i ng  measurements o f  the oxygen 
concent ra t ions.  
An i np rope r l y  designed gaseous oxygen i g n i t e r  
i n s t a l  l a t  ion and n i t r ogen  purge system pre- 
vented the f l o w  o f  oxygen and Fgni t ion o f  the 
f u e l  i n  the  chamber du r i ng  the  s t a r t  sequence. 
A l a rge  amount o f  f u e l  f lowed out  o f  the 
engine and i g n i t e d  ou ts ide  the chamber. The 
plumbing i n s t a l l a t i o n  was no t  designed p roper l y  
nor were procedures se t  up t o  check the 
system operat ion.  
A t  the t ime o f  i g n i t i o n ,  the  chamber pressure 
increase produced an increase i n  system back 
pressure and was propagated i n t o  the o x i d i z e r  
mani fo ld .  Th is  was f o l  lowed by a  second 
pressure surge. The v i b r a t i o n a l  modes and 
h i gh  "g" loads resu l t ed  i n  ac tua to r  l ipseal  
f a i l u r e .  Dur ing r a p i d  va lve  c losure  severe 
v i b r a t i o n s  caused metal-to-metal contact  and 
rubbing of the  aluminum against  the Bnconel-X. 
The heat developed due t o  f r i c t i o n  i s  be1 ieved 
t o  have caused the  f i r e .  Hydrocarbon con- 
taminants found i n  turnbuck le  c a v i t i e s  i n  
va lves  may have a l s o  been the source of  
i g n i t i o n .  A s a t i s f a c t o r y  l eve l  o f  c lean l iness  
was no t  maintained. I r on  oxide, aluminum o x i d  
phosphate l ub r i can t ,  f l uo ro lube ,  a l ipha tes  
hydrocarbon and p a r a f f  ine hydrocarbon were 
found i n  the systems. Increased qua1 i t y  
c o n t r o l  su r ve i l l ance  requi red.  Valve design 
changes suggested. 
Acc iden t / lnc iden t  Desc r i p t i on  
49. A l i q u i d  n i t r ogen  supply was con- 
taminated w i t h  oxygen and al though 
no i n j u r i e s  o r  ser ious inc iden ts  
resu l ted,  the  p o t e n t i a l  was g rea t .  
L i q u i d  n i t r ogen  was suppl ied by a  
vendor i n  a  t r u c k  t h a t  was used f o r  
the t r anspo r t~a t  ion o f  both 1 i q u i d  
oxygen and 1 i q u i d  n i t rogen.  
Apparent ly the t r u c k  was f i l l e d  w i t h  
1 i qu i d  oxygen remaining i n  the vessel .  
The e r r o r  was discovered when a 
techn ic ian  no t i ced  a b l u i s h  hue t o  
the 1 i qu id .  
50. Dur ing preparat ions f o r  s t a t i c  tes t ing ,  
LOX was being pumped from two adjacent 
LOX barges. An expl os ion and f i r e  
occurred on the one barge and a f i r e  
on the second barge. The barge pump 
t h r u s t  bear ing o r  LOX mechanical sea ls  
f a i  led, The seal leaked and the  
rad i a 1 bear i nag temperature dropped. 
The t h r u s t  bear ing cont inued t o  f a  i 1 
a l l ow ing  rubbing of the impe l le r  and 
aluminum pump housing. 
51 .  Dur ing stage s t a t i c  f i r i n g  t e s t  w i t h  
LOX and LH2 propel lants ,  an exp los ion 
occurred des t roy ing  subs tan t ia l  
equipment. The stage exploded before 
scheduled i g n i t i o n  of the p rope l l an t s .  
Damage resu l t ed  t o  s t r uc tu res  about 
800 f t  away. Also damage t o  metal 
door on f a c i l i t y  shop about 1600 f t  
d i s t a n t .  Damage repo r t  heard 12 
mi les  away probably due t o  heavy 
c loud cover ( r e f l e c t i o n  and focus ing 
o f  sound waves). 
Causes 
Requirements f o r  vendor p rac t i ces  were not  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  de ta i l ed .  Purging requirement 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  were no t  p rope r l y  adhered to.  
The tank t r u c k  contents  should be analyzed 
p r i o r  t o  t rans fe r  and s p e c i f i c  g r a v i t y  
measurements taken of the tank contents.  
Fur ther  procedural a c t  ions should inc lude . 
cons idera t ion  o f  one t r uck  on ly  f o r  LN and 2 
t o  f ill dewars from p l a n t  storage tank ra the r  
than vendor 's l oca l  storage tank. 
The rubbing of the impe l le r  aga inst  the 
aluminum housing caused i g n i t i o n  ins ide  the 
pump. Catastrophic f a i l u r e  o f  pump occurred 
due t o  excessive pressures. A leak on the 
second barge was caused by l oss  o f  several 
studs on pump discharge f lange  due t o  
excessive v i b r a t i o n s  o f  the LOX pump. The 
recommended procedures i n  r epo r t i ng  ou t -o f -  
1 i m i t s  temperature i nd i ca t i ons  on the r a d i a l  
bear ing  o f  the LOX pump p r i o r  t o  the pump's 
f a i l u r e  was not  fo l lowed.  A design de f i c i ency  
ex i s t ed  i n  t h a t  inadequate observat ion and 
ins t rumentat ion were prov ided t o  f u l l y  de tec t  
i n c i p i e n t  problems. Pump design, al though 
considered adequate was no t  capable o f  
l i m i t i n g  deformat ion o f  the mechanical seals 
t o  pressures i n  excess of the 50 ps i g  s p e c i f i c a -  
t i o n  which could  occur due t o  the vapo r i za t i on  
o f  LOX. 
The exp los ion was due t o  a  ca tas t roph ic  
f a i l u r e  o f  a  h igh  pressure t i t a n i u m  sphere. 
The tank contained he1 ium gas f o r  propel l a n t  
p ressur i za t ion .  A human e r r o r  r esu l t ed  i n  use 
o f  commercial ly pure t i t a n i u m  f i l l e r  w i r e  f o r  
weld ing the spheres which were made o f  
~ i - 6 A 1 - 4 ~ .  The use of pure t i t a n i u m  f o r  
weld ing i n  p lace o f  the f i l l e r  having the same 
composi t ion as thesphere r esu l t ed  i n  a  30 t o  
40% reduct ion i n  s t rength.  The tank t h a t  
; t ~ i t i a l l y  f a i l e d  was he ld  t o  a  support 
s t r u c t u r e  and du r i ng  f a i l u r e  forced i n  the LOX 
bulkhead. The y i e l d  o f  H2+02 was est imated t o  
be 1% TNT equiva lent .  A t t e n t i o n  was not  g iven 
t o  product ion check o r  vendor c o n t r o l .  
Control and procedure check f o r  weld ing not 
s a t i s f a c t o r y .  
Accident / lnc ident  Desc r i p t i on  
52. Dur ing launch pad c l e a r i n g  operat ion,  
three cars d r i ven  i n t o  an oxygen en- 
r i ched  area i gn i t ed .  LOX was d i s -  
charged i n t o  a drainage d i t c h  and 
cars  d r i v e n  i n t o  oxygen fog. A l l  
th ree  veh ic les  were parked w i t h  
engines o f f .  Center v e h i c l e  engine 
key was turned on and f i r e  s t a r t e d  
under the hood; o ther  two cars 
s t a r t e d  on f i r e  immediately a f t e r .  
A1 1 th ree  cars were destroyed. 
53. Dur ing i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  equipment f o r  
engine t e s t  ing, the purge 1 ines t o  the 
f ue l  and oxygen systems were cross-  
connected and p l ac i ng  the LOX and 
f u e l  system i n  a common l i n e .  The 
oxygen l i n e s  were contaminated w i t h  
hydrocarbons. 
54. Dur ing purg ing o f  a p rope l l an t  load ing 
assembly, a reducing f i t t i n g  was 
i n s t a l l e d  i n  a LOX l i n e  and connected 
t o  a f 1 ex hose. When the va lve down- 
stream o f  the  f i t t i n g  was opened, 
the workman was subjected t o  a stream 
o f  l i q u i d  oxygen. 
Causes 
The dumping o f  l a rge  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  LOX and 
the r e s u l t i n g  format ion o f  vapor clouds 
c o n s t i t u t e  a s i g n i f i c a n t  hazard t o  
personnel and equipment w i t h  which they come 
i n  contact .  The veh ic les  were d r i v e n  i n t o  
and parked i n  t he  oxygen cloud. A flammable 
m i x tu re  o f  oxygen and hydrocarbons accumulated 
under the hood o f  the th ree  cars  whi l e  they 
were parked w i t h  the  engines o f f .  The mix tu re  
i n  t he  second car  was probably i g n i t e d  by a 
spark from t u r n i n g  on the i g n i t i o n  key. For 
the o ther  two cars, i g n i t i o n  probably took 
p lace when the flammable mix tures contacted 
the ho t  surfaces o f  the exhaust mani fo ld .  
The q u a n t i t y  o f  LOX dumped i n t o  drainage 
d i t c h  suggests a volume o f  40% GOX cover ing 
about 20 acres t o  a depth of 4 feet .  System 
design d e f i c i e n c i e s  and procedural de f i c i enc i es  
con t r i bu ted  t o  the acc ident .  
The procedures f o r  connect ing l i n e s  were 
no t  fo l lowed;  i n  add i t i on ,  the work was done 
w i t hou t  au tho r i za t i on .  PI design de f i c i ency  
permi t ted  such a 1 ine in terconnect ing.  
The acc ident  was caused by both design and 
procedural de f i c i enc i es .  A l eak ing  LO)( 
va l ve  permi t ted  t r app ing  o f  LOX i n  the Tine. 
The connections were inadequate as w e l l  as 
the procedures which d i d  no t  deta i 1 the 
operat ions t o  be fol lowed. The q u a l i t y  
c o n t r o l  i nspec t ion  o f  the connect ion was 
d e f i c i e n t .  
Accident/  l nc ident  Descr i p t  ion  Cause 
-
55. The Apo l l o  13 miss ion mishap invo lved 
f a i l u r e  o f  the l i q u i d  oxygen supply 
f o r  the comniand and serv ice  module and 
consequently loss  o f  H -0 fue l  c e l l  2 2 
operat ion. S u f f i c i e n t  contingency 
ac t ions  were taken t o  ensure a  safe 
r e t u r n  o f  the lunar  m iss ion  crew. The 
l i qu i d  oxygen supply tank (Tank No. 2)  
f a i l e d  a t  the e l e c t r i c a l  condui t  tub ing  
a t  the top of the tank. The re lease o f  
oxygen i n t o  t he  bay 4 o f  the  se rv ice  
module r esu l t ed  i n  separat ion o f  t he  
panel cover ing the bay 4 area. The 
panel separat ion caused the oxygen supply 
valves t o  c lose  r e s u l t i n g  i n  the eventual 
l oss  of pressure i n  the second oxygen 
tank (Tank No. 1 ) .  
The accident was caused by i n t e r a c t i n g  
e f f ec t s  due t o  design l i m i t a t i o n s ,  ma te r i a l s  
c o m p a t i b i l i t y  l i m i t a t i o n s ,  and inspect ion,  
q u a l i t y  con t ro l  and procedure de f i c i enc i es .  
The evidence from the s tud ies  conducted 
ind ica ted  t ha t  the po l y t e t r a f l uo roe thy l ene  
i n s u l a t i o n  on the  fan w i r i n g  was i g n i t e d  by" 
a  shor t  c i r c u i t .  The fans i n  the oxygen 
tank a re  a c t i v a t e d  t o  reduce any s t r a t i f i c a -  
t i o n  i n  the s u p e r c r i t i c a l  oxygen. The 
burn ing  of  the i n s u l a t i o n  caused the  tank 
pressure t o  r i s e  r e s u l t i n g  i n  the opening 
o f  the  r e l i e f  va lve  but  the burn ing had 
progressed so t h a t  a l l  e l e c t r i c a l  c i r c u i t s  
t o  t h e  oxygen tank had shorted. The f i r e  
apparent ly  progressed i n t o  the  e l e c t r i c a l  
condui t  t ub i ng  a t  the top  of the tank and 
opened the oxygen supply t o  the se rv ice  
module. One o f  the se rv ice  module panels 
separated r e s u l t i n g  i n  the loss o f  tank 
pressure i n  the adjacent oxygen tank due 
t o  c l o s i n g  o f  oxygen va lve.  The procedures 
i n  operat ions and f a b r i c a t i o n  d i d  no t  
prov ide f o r  s u f f i c i e n t  review o f  anomalies 
when they occur.  S u f f i c i e n t  awareness o f  
the c r i t i c a l i t y  o f  metals and nonmetals 
combined w i t h  heat and i g n i t i o n  sources i n  
oxygen system was no t  demonstrated. 
APPEND l X  A - CONTINUED 
GOX SYSTEMS 
GASEOUS OXYGEN ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS 
Acc ident / lnc ident  Descr ip t ion  Cause 
1 .  Explosion and f i r e  occurred i n  2 inch The p ipe l i n e  conta in ing  the oxygen was 
s t a i n l e s s  s tee l  p i p i n g  conta in ing  considered t o  be contaminated w i t h  a 
oxygen. The p i p i n g  contained 2200 p s i  halogenated hydrocarbon. I g n i t i o n  occurred 
oxygen and was f i t t e d  w i t h  a s ta in less  due t o  f r i c t i o n  through the r e s t r i c t e d  
s tee l  b a l l  va lve.  The s ta in less  s tee l  opening o f  a b a l l  va lve  as i t  was opened. 
b a l l  a n d p i p e w e r e i g n i t e d a n d t h e p i p e  ( f r i c t i o n p r o d u c e d b y o p e r a ~ t i o n o f v a l v e  
bu rs t  i n  several places. pa r t s ) .  
2. F i r e  occurred i n  Two Man Space Environ- F i r e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  shor t  c i r c u i t  caused by 
ment Simulator.  Environmental con- a c c i d e n t a l l y  k i c k i n g  power p lug  located i n  a 
d i t i o n s  a t  t ime o f  f i r e  were 100% O2 f l o o r - l i n e d  receptac le.  The chamber contained 
a t  380 mm Hg. The chamber was repres- two smal l por tab le  CO, f i r e  ex t ingu ishers  but  
L 
sur ized and opened w i t h i n  30 seconds 
one overheated and discharged through the 
subsequent t o  the i n i t i a t i o n  o f  the 
f i r e .  The accident resu l ted  i n  pressure r e l i e f  valve. System design and procedural de f i c i enc ies  con t r i bu ted  t o  f a t a l  i t i e s .  
accident.  
3 .  An oxygen h igh  pressure gas system 
f a i l e d  a t  va lv ing .  The GOX pressure 
was a maximum o f  2250 p s i .  Accident 
resu l ted  i n  2nd and 3rd degree burns. 
Accident a t t r i b u t e d  t o  e i t h e r  bu i ld-up o f  
contaminat ion on va lve  seat o r  sudden en- 
trapment o f  contaminants between b a l l  and 
seat o f  valve. 
4. A GOX a i r c r a f t  b o t t l e  f a i l e d  causing Ma te r ia l s  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  and procedural 
f i r e  and explosions. B o t t l e  pressure de f i c i enc ies  con t r i bu ted  t o  accident.  A loose 
was 1800 ps i .  Accident resu l ted  i n  ny lon  poppet moving under 1800 ps i  o r  heat 
i n j u r i e s .  generated by compression i g n i t e d  the poppet 
i n  the valve, causing f i r e  and explosion, 
5. A i r c r a f t  oxygen breath ing  equipment Accident a t t r i b u t e d  t o  le tharge-g lycero l  
f a i l e d  causing explos ion and f i r e .  cement i n  oxygen c y l i n d e r  i g n i t i o n  by heat 
Extensive damage t o  equipment and generated by compression of  gas when c y l i n d e r  
i n j u r i e s .  Oxygen pressure - 1800 ps i .  va lve was opened. 
6. On space-cabin experiment w i t h  100% The power tube i n  the TV cabin moni tor  f a i l e d  
oxygen, hot  r e s i n  from the base o f  the causing i g n i t i o n  o f  the r e s i n  base and me l t i ng  
power tube i n  TV cabin monitor dropped o f  the  hot  p l a s t i c .  The molten res ins  and 
on coolant  l i n e s  passing beneath. Ruberoid i n s u l a t i o n  d i d  not bu rs t  i n t o  flame, 
Ruberoid i n s u l a t i o n  on coolant  l i n e s  Procedural and design de f i c i enc ies  were 
d i d  not catch on f i r e  but  fumes from responsib le f o r  the accident .Mater ia ls  
the ho t  r e s i n  a l e r t e d  the crew. f a i l u r e  a l s o  con t r i bu ted  t o  the accident cause, 
7. An explos ion occurred when capac i to r  The explos ion was caused by the capac i to r  
was discharged dur ing  experiment w i t h  discharge i n  pure oxygen which was mislabeled 
Febetron Pulsed Electron-Beam X-Ray "Compressed Ai  r, 79% Nitrogen, 21% Oxyqenlt . 
Equipment. The gas was 99% oxygen and 
was contained w i t h i n  f l a s k  designed f o r  
201 5 p s i ;  working pressure was 240 ps i .  
Acc iden t / lnc ider i t  Desc r i p t i on  Cause 
-
8. An exp los ion and f i r e  occurred i n  the The exp los ion  be l ieved  t o  be caused by the 
f i  l t e r  o f  higlh pressure oxygen pump burn ing o f  o x i d i z a b l e  ma te r i a l  i n  bottom of 
equipment. The equipment was used f o r  f i l t e r .  The ma te r i a l  was be l ieved  t o  be 
charg ing se l f - con ta ined  b rea th ing  g l y c e r i n e  which was used f o r  l u b r i c a t i n g  
equipment oxygen cy l i nde rs .  the  pump. 
9.  During t e s t  of a  l i f e  support system 
oxygen source va lve  caught on f i r e  and 
melted. The oxygen source cons is ted 
o f  two s i x  (6) c y l i n d e r  K -bo t t l e  
assembl ies  hooked i n t o  a  common 
man i fo ld  a t  2200 p s i .  The f i r e  occurred 
when the va lve  was turned on t o  
ma in ta in  the man i fo ld  pressure. Per- 
sonnel i n j u r y  and system damage wassus- 
ta ined.  
10. Dur ing conduct o f  pneumatic t e s t s  on a  
stage, an 8 '  f l e x  l i n e  f a i l e d  a t  2000 
p s i  and subsequent whipping damaged 
adjacent GN2 hard 1 ines and propel  l ed  
fragments f o r  75 f t .  
1 1 .  I n  p repara t ion  f o r  an O2 subsystem 
checkout t e s t  o f  a  f l i g h t  veh ic le ,  an 
i ncor rec t  hookup o f  a  f 1 ex 1 ine t o  a  
water l i n e  ins tead o f  an O2 l i n e  
r esu l t ed  i n  rup tu re  o f  the potab le  water 
tank and damage t o  the waste water tank 
and water panel when 250 p s i g  GN2 was 
app l ied  t o  the  H 0 system. No personnel 
i n j u r y .  2 
12. While performing a  leak check o f  a  
ground serv ice  equipment setup du r i ng  
a  prelaunch systems checkout on a  
spacecraft emergency 0 pressure system, 2 
a  wrong f l e x  l i n e  was disconnected and 
capped, a1 lowing the 0 pressure system 2 
t o  be i nadve r t en t l y  pressur ized t o  50% 
above the design bu rs t  l e ve l .  No damage 
resu l  ted but  i t  c o n s t i t u t e d  a  p o t e n t i a l  
accident . 
The f i r e  apparent ly  s t a r t e d  i n  the va lve  
seat which was made of a  po lye ther  ma te r i a l  
which had no t  been tes ted  and approved f o r  
oxygen compat i b i 1 i t y .  A1 so, procedures f o r  
c lean ing  and inspec t ing  o f  oxygen system 
components were no t  adequate. The system con- 
t a i ned  numerous contaminants cons i s t i ng  o f  
aluminum chips, r u s t  and organic  ma te r i a l s .  
Add i t i ona l l y ,  the re  were no f i l t e r s  i n s t a l l e d  
between the source and i n l e t  va lves and 1 ines 
were o f  s t a i n l e s s  s t ee l  w i t h  t e f l o n  pa r t s .  
Mate r ia l  f a i l u r e  o f  the  f l e x  hose. Con- 
t r i b u t i n g  t o  the extens ive damage t h a t  
r esu l t ed  was the  l ack  o f  r e s t r a i n t  o f  the  
f l e x  hose. 
The f l e x  1 ines of the v e h i c l e  system were 
i n c o r r e c t l y  tagged and no procedural i n -  
s t r u c t  ions o r  v e r i f i c a t i o n  methods were used 
p r i o r  t o  a p p l i c a t i o n  of GN2 pressure.  
F a i l u r e  t o  f o l l o w  t e s t  procedures which 
requ i red  the O2 emergency system t o  be 
i s o l a t e d  from the GSE setup dur ing  leak checks 
of  the  GSE equipment. Con t r ibu t ing  cause 
was inadequate. Q u a l i t y  con t ro l / superv is ion  
and su rve i l l ance  dur ing  c r i t i c a l  prelaunch 
checks. 
Acc iden t / lnc iden t  Desc r i p t i on  Cause 
-
13. During p ressu r i za t i on  o f  a  stage 0  2 Dev ia t ion  from normal procedures t o  save time. The GSE r egu la to r  was increased t o  
system, i t  was inadver tent  l y  over-  750 p s i g  t o  save t ime and when pressure pressur ized t o  570 p s i  g  when the reached 350 ps i ,  the r egu la to r  was not  rese t  
s p e c i f i e d  pressure was 350 ps ig .  NO un t  i 1 the pressure reachled 570 ps i g ,  damage occurred but  p o t e n t i a l  damage 
t o  system was e f fec ted .  
14. E l e c t r i c  sparks ( s t a t i c  discharge) A design de f i c i ency  i n  s e l e c t i o n  o f  i n s u l a t i n g  
were observed dur ing  hand1 ing of 0, ma te r i a l  i n  the storage boxes f o r  the 
L 
cannis ters .  The mate r ia l  generated a  s t a t i c  
cond i t i on i ng  cann is te rs  under atmos- 
charge when the s ta i n l ess  s tee l  cann is te rs  phe r i c  cond i t i ons  i n  a  veh i c l e .  
S t a t i c  e l e c t r i c i t y  was no t  b led  o f f  were removed, due t o  inadequate grounding o f  
storage boxes. 
causing e l e c t r i c a l  d ischarge - which 
could  be a  source o f  i g n i t i o n  i n  a  
100% 0  atmosphere. No personnel 2 
i n j u r i e s .  
15. Dur ing checkout o f  the  f u e l  and 
p rope l l an t  system i n  the h i gh  
pressure t e s t  f a c i  1 i t y ,  the f ue l  
and o x i d i z e r  o r i f i c e s  d i d  no t  f l ow  
i n  accordance w i t h  s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  
Complete ana lys is  o f  the  system 
revealed a  p l a s t i c  cover i n  the 
o x i d i z e r  l i n e  downstream o f  the 
o r i f i c e ,  reversa l  o f  the f ue l  and 
o x i d i z e r  o r i f i c e s  dur ing  i n s t a l l a -  
t i o n  and damaged l i nes ,  s t r a i n e r  
and o r i f i c e s .  
16. Dur ing h y d r o s t a t i c  p roo f  pressure t e s t  
of pressure b o t t l e  f o r  a  spacecraf t  
emergency oxygen system ( 1  3,250 ps ig )  
the  b o t t l e  weld f a i l e d  a t  9000 p s i g  
due t o  a  f a u l t y  weld. The pressure 
vessel was destroyed, however, no 
personnel i n j u r i e s  were sustained. 
17. A f t e r  complet ing t r a n s f e r  o f  a  C02/02 
gas mix tu re  from a  "K" b o t t l e  t o  a  small 
hoke-type cy l inder ,  attempted c losure  o f  
the c y l  inder needle va lve  r esu l t ed  i n  
the va lve  f a i  1 i nq  and the va lve  stem 
lnadequate work con t ro l  procedures dur ing  
assembly, packaging, i n s t a l l a t i o n  and 
c leaning.  The p l a s t i c  cover was i d e n t i f i e d  
as a  type used t o  seal l i n e  ends dur ing  
c lean ing  o r  packaging. 'The o x i d i z e r  o r i f i c e  
had been i n s t a l l e d  on the f ue l  l i n e  and v i c e  
versa dur ing  assembly and the s t r a i ne r ,  1 fnes, 
and o r i f i c e  had rece ived minor damage dur ing  
i n s t a l l a t i o n .  Con t r ibu t ing  cause t o  t h i s  
inc iden t  was inadequate inspect ion o f  c r i t i c a l  
work and f a i l u r e  t o  exerc ise p o s i t i v e  con t ro l  
over ma te r i a l s  used i n  assembly and packaging 
o f  c r i t i c a l  f l i g h t  systerns. 
lnadequate manufacturing con t ro l  and i n -  
spect ion procedures. The weld seam f a i l e d  
due t o  incomplete f us i on  of the  b o t t l e  h a l f ,  
apparent ly  caused by e i t h e r  improper cen te r ing  
o f  t he  h igh  i n t e n s i t y  f us i on  welding on the 
seam o r  be ing d i r e c t e d  a t  an i nco r rec t  angle. 
X-ray inspec t ion  o f  the welded seam d i d  not  
reveal  the discrepancy. 
Mate r ia l  f a i l u r e  o f  the  va lve  stem and the 
apparent l a c k  of an es tab l i shed  procedure f o r  
p e r i o d i c  h y d r o s t a t i c  test:s o r  o ther  c o n t r o l l e d  
maintenance as evidenced by no inspec t ion  o r  
t e s t  record stamp on the c y l  i nder. 
blew-out a t  a  pressure of 1350 ps ig .  No 
personnel i n j u r i e s ,  however, a  p o t e n t i a l l y  
hazardous c o n d i t i o n  ex is ted .  
Acc iden t / lnc iden t  Desc r i p t i on  
18. A f i r e  occurred dur ing  the operat  i on  
o f  a  h i gh  pressure oxygen serv ice  
system. The ny lon seats o f  b a l l  
va lves were t es ted  and found t o  de- 
compose and burn under the h i gh  
pressure condi t ions. 
19, Dur ing checkout t e s t  i n  h i gh  Mach 
number tunnel i n  which oxygen en- 
r i ched  combustion a i r  i s  made t o  
burn w i t h  methane, a  f i r e  and ex- 
p l os i on  occurred downstream o f  the 
o r i f i c e  used t o  measure the f low.  
The f i r e  occu~rred when a swi tch was 
operated which would permi t  ac tua t i on  
o f  an a i r  s igna l  f o r  the con t ro l  o f  
the  oxygen con t ro l  valve.  High 
pressure was introduced i n t o  the 
system which resu l t ed  i n  the rup- 
t u r e  o f  the  pressure t ransducers and 
t r ansm i t t e r  a1 lowing damping f l u i d  
t o  be discharged i n t o  the main oxygen 
l ine. The o i  1 reacted w i t h  the oxygen, 
proniot i ng  combust ion o f  the s t a i n l e s s  
s tee l  p i p i n g  and va lv ing .  
20. Dur ing p roo f  t e s t i n g  o f  a  spacecraf t  O2 
con t ro l  module on an environmental con t ro l  
system,a f i r e  occurred which blew o f f  a  
cap boss when an O2 r i n g  seal f a i l e d  per-  
m i t t i n g  a  subsequent 1400 p s i g  pressure 
surge. 
21. Dur ing ox ida t ion /humid i t y  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
t e s t s  on spacecraf t  components i n  a  
t e s t  tank, (ambient pressure o f  7 psia, 
95 2 .5% 02, 95 f 5% humid i t y  and 90°F), 
an exp los ion occurred w i t h i n  the tank 
when polyurethane foam used under the  
water pan swelled, causing a suspended 
e l e c t r i c a l  immersion heater t o  touch 
the bottom o f  the tank. S u f f i c i e n t  
l o c a l i z e d  hea t ing  was generated t o  ig -  
n i t e  the O2 sa tu ra ted  foam. No per-  
Cause 
-
A design de f i c iency  i n  spec i f y i ng  ny lon 
seats f o r  b a l l  valves.  Test r e s u l t s  showed 
t h a t  ny lon  decomposed and burned due t o  
heat  o f  compression a t  h i g h  pressures. 
( ~ e s t  pressures used were 1800 t o  4000 psig.)  
A system design and operat iona l  performance 
de f i c iency  permi t ted  s u f f i c i e n t  pressure 
from a prev ious run  t o  remain i n  the  l i n e  
lead ing t o  the con t ro l  system t o  operate the 
con t ro l  va lve  w i thou t  ac tua t i on  o f  the a i r  
s igna l  con t ro l  systems. Opening o f  the 
con t ro l  va lve  r a p i d l y  probably r esu l t ed  i n  
r a p i d  compression w i t h  temperatures from 
1900 t o  2200°R. The h i gh  temperature and 
pressure caused rup tu re  o f  the be1 lows i n  
the f l o w  measuring instruments, a tomiz ing the 
damping f l u i d  and causing f i r e  and explosions 
a t  downstream connections. Mate r ia l  and R&QA 
requirements were not  s u f f i c i e n t l y  d e t a i l e d  
t o  prec lude the  use o f  noncompatible ma te r i a l s .  
The 0 r i n g  seals were be ing reused on sub- 2  
sequent t e s t s  i n  l i e u  o f  i n s t a l l i n g  new seals. 
Also, a  thread l u b r i c a t i o n  which was no t  
compat ib le w i t h  oxygen was used and thereby 
caused i g n i t i o n  when the pressure surge 
occurred. 
A design de f i c i ency  i n  the  t e s t  setup f o r  
conduct ing t e s t s  i n  h i g h  O2 and humid i t y  
environments. The h i g h l y  sa tu rab le  po l y -  
urethane foam was no t  compatible w i t h  the  
t e s t  environment due t o  i t s  p rox im i t y  w i t h  
the heater  and suscept i b i  1 i t y  t o  i g n i t i o n  
from heat generated by the heater .  Also, 
the re  was l ack  o f  adequate sa fe t y  ana lys is  - 
and QC v e r i f i c a t i o n  p r i o r  t o  t es t s .  
sonnel i n j u r i e s ,  however labora to ry  
equipment sustained damage and t e s t  
u n i t s  requ i red  replacement. 
Acc iden t / lnc iden t  Descr ip t ion  - Cause 
22. GN and 0 f a c i l  i t y  1 ines a t  a t e s t  2 2 \ Procedural due t o  the  l ack  o f  d e t a i l e d  maintenance/repair proceclures and check1 i s t s .  f a c i l i t y  were i nadve r t en t l y  cross- Also, the re  was an i n s t a l l a t i o n  design 
connected on the r o o f  a t  a j u n c t i o n  
t d e f i c i ency  due t o  l ack  of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  header when the l i n e s  were disconnected lines, i.e., no coding or connector 
t o  c o r r e c t  a leak.  Test setups were s i z ing ,  and l ack  o f  adequate work inspect ion.  
contaminated and systems/l i nes requ i red 
purging. 
23. One person was f a t a l l y  burned and one inadequate maintenance procedures f o r  100% 
se r i ous l y  i n j u red  i n  a space chamber oxygen environments. Con t r ibu t ing  was 
under 100% oxygen when a f l a s h  f i r e  f a i l u r e  t o  ensure t h a t  non-flammable 
occurred du r i ng  r o u t i n e  maintenance ma te r i a l s  were used and f a i l u r e  t o  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
from an e l e c t r i c a l  spark. The r a t e  equipment f o r  use i n  oxygen environment. 
chamber was destroyed. 
24. During an unmanned 500 hour l i f e  cyc l e  A design de f i c i ency  i n  the t e s t  i n s t a l l a t i o n .  
t e s t  o f  a space v e h i c l e  i n  a chamber The heat  tape had been i n s t a l l e d  as p a r t  o f  
w i t h  100% oxygen, a f i r e  broke out  a t  the  t e s t  setup and had not  been s p e c i f i c a l l y  
480 hours from a spark from an e lec -  r a ted  f o r  a 100% oxygen environment, The 
t r  i c a l  tape. Severe damage t o  the w i res  i n  the tape shorted, i g n i t i n g  the 
chamber and veh i c l e  resu l ted .  flammable ma te r i a l  i n  the environment. 
25. Two f l i g h t  crew members were se r i ous l y  A design de f i c i ency  i n  the i n s t a l l a t i o n  which 
i n j u red  i n  a space chamber under 100% permi t ted  an overloaded e l e c t r i c a l  c i r c u i t  
oxygen when an e l e c t r i c a l  spark caused under the instrument panel t o  overheat and 
a f i r e  on the t h i r t e e n t h  day o f  a cause i g n i t i o n .  Con t r ibu t ing  was l ack  o f  
s imulated 14 day space mission. adequate p lanning and s p e c i f i c a t i o n  f o r  
equipment used i n  100% oxygen environment. 
26. Dur ing a pressure t e s t  us ing  a b i o -  Primary cause was inadequate c lean ing  pro-  
s a t e l l i t e  bleed and f i l l  l i n e  t o  cedures and s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  0, comoonents. 
L pressur i ze  an 0 system vessel t o  3500' 
p s i g  and bleed 'down t o  500 psig, a The t e s t  a r t i c l e  had rece ived on l y  standard 
f i r e  occurred i n  the f i l l  l i n e  when bleed c lean ing  a t  the manufacturer, and i t  was 
c e r t i f i e d  f o r  use i n  O2 systems; however, down was i n i t i a t e d .  Accident r esu l t ed  
i n  damage t o  t he  system and personnel aluminum chips and r u s t  were found i n  the 
i n j u r y .  system. Neoprene was used f o r  the r egu la to r  
diaphragm, which was found unsafe f o r  O2 
systems and there  was no f i l t e r  on the i n l e t  
s i de  o f  the r egu la to r .  I g n i t i o n  was alpparently 
caused by impi ngement o f  contaminants against  
the w a l l s  o f  the 1 ines. 
Acc iden t / lnc iden t  Desc r i p t i on  
Dur ing p repara t ion  f o r  a  re1 i a b i  1 i t y  
t e s t  on a  GOX duct assembly o f  a  
booster stage, a  s  i x  inch "hot" 1 ine 
ruptured under pressure o f  3200 ps i g  
a t  610 degrees F, and damaged 
adjacent p ip ing .  Uneven hea t ing  o f  
the p i pe  caused i t  t o  overs t ress  
l o c a l l y .  The system was be ing 
pressur ized w i t h  gaseous n i t rogen .  
28, Dur ing acceptance t e s t i n g  of emergency 
oxygen equipm~ent, an inc iden t  occurred 
causing an o u t - o f - s p e c i f i c a t i o n  
pressure c o n d i t i o n  t o  e x i s t  because o f  
a  damaged "0" r i ng .  The "O1I r i n g  was 
damaged dur ing  assembly. No damage 
t o  equipment bu t  a  leak occurred 
r e q u i r i n g  re- run of t e s t .  
29. Dur ing checkout o f  ground support 
oxygen resusc i t a t o r ,  a  f i r e  occurred 
i n  the  h i g h  pressure s ide  and burned 
through the  regu la to r .  The u n i t  
charged w i t h  2200 p s i  oxygen was be ing 
readied as emergency equipment f o r  the 
a l t i t u d e  chamber. The probable source 
o f  the f i r e  was the pr imary seat i n  the 
r egu la to r .  
30. A r egu la to r  c o n t r o l l i n g  an oxygen and 
b rea th ing  a i r  system f a i l e d  t o  shut 
o f f  permi t t i  ny gas t o  escape and 
causing a  f i r e .  Examination ind ica ted  
heat and flame damage through the  p o r t  
area opening and cha r r i ng  o f  the 
r egu la to r  seat. The va lve  was melted 
and deforrnea. 
31. Dur ing p repara t ion  f o r  a l t i t u d e  chamber 
pumpdown f o r  spacecraf t  purge and leak 
check, 100% 0 ,  was used f o r  the purge 
L 
instead o f  65% O2 and 35% N2. Damage 
d i d  no t  occur bu the environment 




A design de f i c iency  i n  the t e s t  setup. The 
hea t ing  element on the l i n e  permi t ted  uneven 
hea t ing  and caused ho t  spots which weakened 
the l i n e .  The ins t rumentat ion provided 
"average1' thermocoupl es read i ngs and d  i d  no t  
p rov ide  loca temperature of ho t  spots. Un- 
au thor i zed  s u b s t i t u t i o n s  were u t  i 1 ized and 
thermocouples were o f  a  d i f f e r e n t  s ize.  Con- 
t r i b u t i n g  causes were inadequate procedures 
f o r  con t ro l  of p a r t s  purchases and inadequate 
work con t ro l  procedures. 
Inc iden t  was caused by improper i n s t a l l a t i o n  
procedures. The back-up r i n g  had been 
damaged and the  "0l1 r i n g  was extruded i n t o  
the damaged r i n g .  The damage was not  no t i ced  
by inspect ion.  
The pr imary cause o f  the accident was the 
use o f  incompat ib le ma te r i a l s .  The seat was 
made o f  nylon, a  mate r ia l  considered un- 
s a t i s f a c t o r y  f o r  100% oxygen use. Studies 
ind ica ted  t h a t  e i t h e r  a  small p a r t i c l e  o r  
thread o f  the ny lon seat l e f t  from the i n i t i a l  
machining i g n i t e d  the  ny lon seat. The i n -  
spec t ion  and procedural  de f i c i enc i es  p e r m i t t i n g  
ma te r i a l  no t  s a t i s f a c t o r y  f o r  oxygen a1 so 
con t r i bu ted  t o  the acc ident .  
A ma te r i a l s  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  and design de- 
f i c iency  were t he  cause o f  the f a i l u r e .  A 
m e t a l l i c  ob j ec t  was removed from the i n l e t  
p o r t  o f  the r egu la to r .  The metal b a l l  
o r i g i n a t e d  upstream o f  the r egu la to r  and the 
impact was probably respons ib le  f o r  the  
i g n i t i o n  o f  the ny lon seat. 
The cause o f  t h i s  inc iden t  was human e r r o r  
s ince the pressure r e l i e f  and panel con- 
f i g u r a t i o n  were s p e c i f i e d  i n  the t e s t  check- 
ou t  procedures. Procedural and design 
changes should be added t o  r equ i r e  gas 
sample ana lys is  be fo re  m ix tu re  enters  space- 
c r a f t .  Lack o f  QC v e r i f i c a t i o n , a n d  lack  o f  
i nspec t ion  o f  va lve se t t i ngs  con t r i bu ted  t o  
acc ident .  
Acc iden t / lnc iden t  Desc r i p t i on  
32. Dur ing f ue l  c e l l  p ressu r i za t i on  o f  
v e h i c l e  oxygen system, the tank was 
overpressur ized t o  about 25% above 
the design bu rs t  valve.  No damage 
was done bu t  a  ser ious hazard was 
produced. 
33. Wh i l e  performing leak  check o f  space- 
c r a f t  emergency oxygen systems, the 
wrong f l e x  l i n e  was disconnected and 
capped a l l ow ing  systems t o  be 
pressur ized t o  900 psig,  50% above 
design b u r s t  l e v e l .  
34. F i r e  damage t o  p a r t s  o f  rocket  engine 
used i n  l i f t i n g  body research a i r -  
c r a f t  was no t i ced  a f t e r  r e t u r n  from 
f l i g h t .  F i r e  damage was a l s o  sus- 
ta ined  on the a i r c r a f t  con t ro l  sur -  
faces adjacent t o  the engine. The 
f i r e  was probably a t  a  low l e v e l  o f  
i n t e n s i t y  i n i t i a l l y ,  y e t  s u f f i c i e n t  
t o  me l t  a  sec t ion  of aluminum GOX 
1 i ne. One o f  the 1 i nes appeared t o  
have been softened, swel l  ed by i n -  
t e rna l  pressure and eventual 1 y rup- 
tured.  F i r e  must have i n t e n s i f i e d  
as GOX l i n e s  ruptured causing addi -  
t i o n a l  damage. 
35. Dur ing the pressure t e s t i n g  o f  a  tank 
t o  be used f o r  the  t e s t i n g  o f  a  qu ick  
re lease manhole cover, the tank bu rs t  
caus ing extens i ve  damage. The tank 
bu rs t  a t  a  pressure between 60 and 
67 ps ig .  The tank had w i ths tood  a 
pressure o f  60  p s i g  i n  a  prev ious t e s t .  
36. Dur ing rece i v i ng  inspec t ion  tests ,  
convoluted f l e x i b l e  ducts o f  the "Y" 
GOX c o l l e c t o r  were damaged when a 
t e s t  f i x t u r e  was improper ly i n s t a l l e d .  
No i n j u r y  t o  personnel. 
Cause 
Dur i ng the  p ressu r i za t i on  process, the 'X t"  
b o t t l e  source o f  gas was replaced bu t  the 
r egu la t i ng  va lve had no t  been ad justed f o r  
the h igher  tank pressure. Procedural and 
design 1 i m i t a t i o n s  were t.he cause o f  the 
acc ident .  
A test /checkout procedure was used bu t  
human e r r o r  was respons ib le  f o r  the acc ident ,  
Q.C. su r ve i l l ance  was inadequate t o  catch 
mistake. .System design was d e f i c i e n t  i n  
p e r m i t t i n g  making wrong connection. 
The f i r e  probably s t a r t ed  j u s t  a f t e r  pro-  
p e l l a n t  j e t t i s o n i n g  was i n i t i a t e d .  l g n i t i o n  
source could have been the  engine nozzle 
extensions. The system design de f i c ienc ies ,  
ma te r i a l s  l i m i t a t i o n s  and procedural de- 
f i c i e n c i e s  con t r i bu ted  t o  the  acc ident ,  
Ma te r i a l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  d i d  no t  consider the 
use o f  l ess  vu lnerab le  f l e x i b l e  hyd rau l i c  
l i nes ,  i ns t rumenta t ion  w i r i n g  and o ther  
damping devices t o  the f i r e  damage. Opera- 
t i o n a l  procedures were d e f i c i e n t  i n  not 
p e r m i t t i n g  a  safe minimum delay between shut-  
down and j e t t i s o n  of the p rope l lan ts ,  
Ma te r i a l  f a i l u r e s  and t h e i r  r e l a t i onsh ips  t o  
engine damage when exposed t o  f i r e  were not  
evaluated. 
I n s u f f i c i e n t  communicatio~n among those 
respons ib le  f o r  the t e s t  t o  prov ide the design 
in fo rmat ion  f o r  t he  tank t e s t i n g  was the 
cause o f  the acc ident .  A misunderstanding 
concerning the tank  design pressure ex i s t ed  
between the designers and operators.  Blue- 
p r i n t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  ind ica ted  the  tank had 
been designed f o r  150 ps i g  when it a c t u a l l y  
had a l i m i t  o f  50.7 ps ig .  
The pr imary cause was procedural i n  t h a t  
the  workman neglected t o  r e s t r a i n  the 
f l e x i b l e  ducts  w i t h  a v a i l a b l e  clamps. The 
be1 lows ruptured a t  350 p s i  and qua1 i t y  
con t ro l  i n s t r u c t i o n s  d i d  no t  prov ide warning 
note t o  ensure use o f  be1 lows r e t a i n i n g  
c l  amps. 

Acc iden t / lnc iden t  Desc r i p t i on  
43. Dur ing pre-launch leak checks o f  
instrument conta iners  w i t h  GN2 a t  a  
pressure supply o f  1750 psig, a  
r egu la to r  f a i l e d .  The f l o w  was by- 
passed causing overp ressur i za t ion  
o f  the conta iner  and damaging the 
bulkhead and tank. 
&. During a p roo f  pressure t e s t  of an 
oxygen panel, the low pressure s ide 
(210 ps ig )  was i nadve r t en t l y  sub- 
j ec ted  t o  pressure from the h i gh  
pressure s ide  (1500 ps ig )  when the 
h igh pressure shu to f f  on a  common 
'IT" connect ion was not c l  osed. 
45. During a space s imu la t i on  tes t ,  an 
exp los ion occurred i n  the oxygen 
system o f  a  t e s t  chamber causing 
system damage. 
46. Dur ing checkout o f  a  check va lve  under 
cryogenic temperatures i n  a  t e s t  c e l l ,  
an exp los ion  occurred i n j u r i n g  one 
person and causing minor damage t o  
equipment. System was being 
pressur ized t o  3000 p s i  and exp los ion 
occurred a t  2900 p s i .  
47. The oxygen supply system o f  a  v e h i c l e  
environmental con t ro l  system was con- 
taminated w i t h  mercury dur ing  replace- 
ment o f  a  so lenoid  valve.  Mercury 
was discovered i n  the co ld  t r a p  o f  the 
leak de tec to r  dur ing  subsequent leak 
checks. Inc ident  requ i red  complete 
ana lys is  and c lean ing  o f  e n t i r e  
system. 
48. Dur ing q u a l i f i c a t i o n  t e s t i n g  o f  a  
spacecraf t  f u e l  c e l l  power system, the 
t e s t  was prematurely terminated by an 
e l e c t r i c a l  f a i l u r e  caused by carbon 
depos i ts  from c leaning f l u i d  r es i dua l s  
l e f t  i n  the system. 
Cause 
The cause was procedural i n  con junc t ion  w i t h  
a  design de f i c i ency .  A p l a s t i c  dust  cap 
was l e f t  i n  the  qu ick  disconnect f o r  the  
instrument conta iner  pressure sensor causing 
erroneous pressure readings. I n  add i t i on ,  
a  900 p s i  pressure source was used on a low 
pressure system w i t h  the  bypassing o f  the 
r egu la to r .  No re1 i e f  vallve was provided i n  
the  conta iner .  
Procedural e r r o r  i n  f a i l i n g  t o  c lose  the 
h i gh  pressure s ide of the "T" connect ion.  
Con t r ibu t ing  was l ack  o f  adequate v e r i f i c a -  
t i o n  o f  t e s t  i n s t a l l a t i o n  p r i o r  t o  t e s t s  and 
f a i l u r e  t o  inc lude adequate warning notes 
i n  t e s t  procedures. 
A design de f i c i ency  i n  t h a t  noncompatible 
seals used i n  the  b a l l  valves were subject  
t o  impact i g n i t i o n  w i t h  oxygen. Subsequent 
impact t e s t s  confirmed t h i s  compat ib i l  i t y .  
The operator  f a i l e d  t o  sihut o f f  the power 
and c lose  the so lenoid  valves a f t e r  a  
previous run, as requ i red  by the t e s t  
procedure. Con t r ibu t ing  causes were a leak ing  
hand valve, l a ck  o f  a  pr~essure r e l i e f  device 
i n  the t e s t  set-up and f a i l u r e  t o  prov ide 
operator  w i t h  the  l a t e s t  r e v i s i o n  t o  the 
t e s t  procedure. 
Lack o f  adequate procedures f o r  the con t ro l  
o f  instruments con ta in ing  mercury i n  the 
manufactur ing and t e s t  f a c i l i t i e s .  Mercury 
was apparent ly  introduced through a 
so lenoid  bypass va lve which had been replaced 
i n  the system. 
The c lean ing  procedure being used was i n -  
adequate t o  ensure complete removal o f  a l l  
c lean ing  f l u i d  res idua ls .  Con t r ibu t ing  was 
f a i l u r e  t o  estab l  i sh  by ana lys is  and t es t ,  
the c o m p a t i b i l i t y  o f  the c lean ing  agent w i t h  
the carbon depos i ts  and w i t h  the oxygen 
system e lect rodes.  
Acc iden t / lnc iden t  Desc r i p t i on  
49. During a  manned crew t r a i n i n g  t e s t  
i n  a  vacuum chamber, e l e c t r i c a l  
a r c i n g  o f  an i n t e r i o r  overhead 
f luo rescen t  l i g h t  occurred. The 
chamber pressure was equ iva len t  
t o  200,000 f t ,  a l t i t u d e .  No 
personnel i n j u r i e s  o r  hardware 
damage occurred. 
50, Dur ing q u a l i f i c a t i o n  t e s t  o f  an 
env i ronmental con t ro l  system i n  an 
a l  t i  tude chambaer, the commercial 
grade s t r i p  heater tape f a i l e d  
causing sho r t i ng  o f  the w i res  and 
i g n i t i o n  o f  the  flammable ma te r i a l .  
The a l t i t u d e  chamber was a t  5 p s i  
and 100% oxygen. The con t ro l  





Primary cause was due t o  chamber design 
de f i c iency .  The f a i l u r e  o f  f l uo rescen t  
l i g h t s  was found t o  be common bu t  was 
no t  taken i n t o  account i n  the chamber 
design. S u f f i c i e n t  heat  i s  generated t o  
m e l t  po r t i ons  o f  the e l e c t r i c a l  f i x t u r e  
and w i r ing ,  the  metal end o f  the f l uo rescen t  
tube and f i n a l l y  sha t t e r  the g lass near the 
anode. Sodium i n  the  g lass ac t s  as a  cathode 
a f t e r  extended usage making a r c i ng  poss ib le  
between the anode and the glass.  
System design and procedural  d e f i c i e n c i e s  
were respons ib le  f o r  the  accident.  The 
t e s t  set  up evolved from sketches and o r a l  
communication. Approved t e s t  hardware 
ma te r i a l s  were no t  used. Adequate sa fe ty  
and emergency procedures were no t  es tab l  i shed. 
APPENDIX A - C0NTINUIi:D 
NON-NASA M l SHAPS 
During s e r v i c i n g  o f  a  T-33 a i r c r a f t  w i t h  
oxygen w i t h  opera t ing  pressures o f  350 
p s i  on cockp i t  gage and 400 ps i  on c a r t  
gage, a  muf f led  exp los ion was heard. 
Flame was observed coming ou t  o f  nose 
wheel wel 1 . The explos ion and f i r e  
burned a  ho le  i n  the a i r c r a f t  sk in .  
F i r e  s t a r t e d  from w i t h i n  tub ing  and 
f i t t i n g  system. Aluminum tub ing  wa l l  was 
burned away ( p a r t i a l l y )  i n  d i r e c t i o n  o f  
oxygen f l ow. 
Dur ing s e r v i c i n g  of oxygen system on T-33 
a i r c r a f t ,  an exp los ion  and f i r e  occurred 
a t  the oxygen c a r t  being used f o r  pro-  
v i d i n g  gaseous oxygen. A man a t  the 
oxygen c a r t  was con t ro l 1  ing the pressure 
regu la to r .  The pressure a t  the r egu la to r  
was being increased and the a i r c r a f t  gage 
was being observed t o  increase s lowly .  
The f i r e  a t  the c a r t  r esu l t ed  i n  f a t a l  
i n j u r i e s .  
Aft,er an aircraft landed, an explosion 
occurred from w i t h i n  the cockp i t  area. 
The p i  l o t  noted some smoke from the cock- 
p i t  area w i t h  subsequent f 1 ash f i r e .  
A i r c r a f t  cockp i t  oxygen emergency b o t t l e  
exploded du r i ng  s e r v i c i n g  (T-28) on pre-  
f l i g h t  check. Intense f i r e  i n  seat pan 
area. (S im i la r  acc ident  occurred 4 
months l a t e r  .) 
Dur ing a  p r e f l i g h t  check which invo lved 
t u r n i n g  on the a i r c r a f t  oxygen system, 
a  f i r e  s ta r ted .  The f i r e  was acce lerated 
due t o  the oxygen and at tempts t o  pu t  out  
the f i r e  were unsuccessful . 
The f i r e  s t a r t e d  w i t h i n  the  tub ing  and 
f i t t i n g s  due t o  i n t e rna l  contaminat ion o f  
system w i t h  hydrocarbons or poss ib le  over-  
t o rqu ing  o f  connections. Improper s e r v i c i n g  
procedures generat ing excessive heat i n  the 
system con t r i bu ted  t o  mishap. 
Et was be l ieved  t h a t  the f i r e  was caused by 
grease o r  o i l  contaminat ion present on the  
p u r i f i e r  c y l  inder.  
A  low pressure oxygen check va lve f a i l e d .  
A  small crack was no t i ced  i n  the  f i t t i n g  
which was probably caused by over torqu ing.  
Leakage o f  oxygen i n t o  the are3 which contained 
a  l a rge  amount o f  o i l  r esu l t ed  i n  the  f i r e  
and explosion. 
Cause o f  f a  i 1 u re  be1 ieved t o  be due t o  
contaminat ion i n  oxygen system, Contamina- 
t i o n  considered t o  be introduced dur ing  
se rv ic ing .  Rapid charging resu l t ed  i n  
excessive temperature and pressure due t o  
o x i d a t i o n  o f  rubber plunger washer on va lve 
cone. 
An oxygen va lve f a i l e d  due t o  f a t i g u e  and the 
escaping oxygen impinged on the i n s u l a t i o n  
and surrounding ma te r i a l s .  System design 
d e f i c i e n c i e s  prevented s h u t t i n g  o f f  the 
oxygen supply. 
During an i n e r t i n g  opera t ion  o f  an a i r -  
c r a f t  f u e l  l i n e  w i t h  oxygen, a  f i r e  
and exp los ion  occurred dest roy;  ng the 
a i r c r a f t  and r e s u l t i n g  i n  a  number o f  
f a t a l  i t i e s .  
An exp los ion  and f i r e  erupted du r i ng  
serv i c i n g  o f  rea r  cockp i t  (T-28 a i r c r a f  t )  
h i gh  pressure gaseous oxygen b o t t l e .  
The oxygen 1 ine was connected from the 
s e r v i c i n g  c a r t  and p r i o r  t o  p ressu r i z i ng  
b a i l o u t  b o t t l e ,  the f i r e  occurred. 
P i l o t ,  i n  a i r c r a f t ,  was prepar ing f o r  
t e s t  f 1 i ght when f 1 ame shot out between 
h i s  legs. The flame came from under the 
seat pan and was s i m i l a r  t o  a  blow torch.  
The p i  l o t  re1 eased the  1 eg s t raps  and 
r o l l e d  c l e a r  o f  cockp i t ,  r ece i v i ng  burns 
on both hand and legs. 
F i r e  occurred i n  cockp i t  area o f  a i r -  
c r a f t .  P i  l o t  experienced general 
f a i l u r e ,  fo l l owed by smoke i n  cockp i t  
and w i t h i n  seconds the oxygen was l o s t  
and flames erupted. P i l o t  received 
burns; e jec ted  and rescued by he1 i cop te r .  
A i r c r a f t  exploded p r i o r  t o  impacting 
water.  
A i r c r a f t  was be ing prepared f o r  s e r v i c i n g  
w i t h  oxygen. The oxygen c a r t  had been 
pos i t i oned  near the a i r c r a f t ;  the  hose 
pressur ized t o  425 p s i  and w h i l e  be ing 
connected t o  the  a i r c r a f t  recep tac le  
an exp los ion and f i r e  occurred. 
F i r e  was i n i t i a t e d  i n  cab in  o f  a i r c r a f t  
located i n  hangar. F i r e  prov ided 
s u f f i c i e n t  heat t o  me l t  aluminum f i t t i n g  
c o n t r o l l i n g  oxygen. F i r e  spread t o  5 
o ther  planes, 
The ma te r i a l  be ing used f o r  i n e r t i n g  was 
oxygen ins tead of n i t rogen .  The c y l i n d e r s  
were s t e n c i l e d  oxygen. The h igh  pressure 
oxygen reacted w i t h  t he  fue l  remaining i n  
the l i n e s .  System design and procedural  
d e f i c i e n c i e s  con t r i bu ted  t o  the cause o f  - 
the mishap. 
Hydrocarbon contaminat ion i n  the area o f  the 
s e r v i c i n g  connect ion was suspected as caus isg 
the  f i r e .  The contaminat ion was due t o  
personnel no t  f o l l o w i n g  safety  precaut ions.  
Contamination came i n  con tac t  w i t h  the  hose 
f i t t i n g s ;  1 i nes and hoses no t  purged nor 
s to red  p roper l y .  The f i 1 t e r  va lve ind ica ted  
damage due t o  dragging on hard ground (con- 
c re te ) .  
The cause o f  the  mishap was suspected t o  
be f a i l u r e  o f  non-compatible ny lon va lve 
seat i n  the emergency oxygen b o t t l e .  F i r e  
was f ed  by seat pad and o ther  ma te r i a l .  
Cause not  known bu t  considered t o  be due t o  
ma te r i a l  f a i l u r e  i n  oxygen system. 
P r i o r  t o  exp los ion  a small l eak  was heard i n  
v i c i n i t y  o f  p u r i f i e r .  The p u r i f i e r  and 
f i l t e r  element were burned. The use o f  non- 
compat ib le ma te r i a l s  and procedural  
d e f i c i e n c i e s  con t r i bu ted  t o  mishap. 
Fuel l eak i ng  from l i n e  supply ing heater  was 
i g n i t e d  by shor t  c i r c u i t  i n  ba t t e r y .  
Aluminum f i t t i n g  melted o f f  O2 con t ro l  a l l ow -  
ing O2 t o  be fed i n t o  f i r e .  Mate r ia l  
f a i l u r e s  combined w i t h  system design and 
opera t iona l  procedure d e f i c i e n c i e s  con- 
t r  i buted t o  acc ident.  
F i r e  i n i t i a t e d  i n  passenger compartment 
o f  a i r c r a f t  wh i l e  men were removing 
l ino leum w i t h  acetone and c lean ing  seats 
w i t h  o ther  h i g h l y  flammable so lvents .  
F i r e  spread r a p i d l y  causing oxygen 
re1 i e f  vent valves from 4 c y l i n d e r s  on 
board t o  open. Hangar's deluge system 
conf ined the f i r e .  
F i r e  was be l ieved  t o  be i n i t i a t e d  by a 
s t a t i c  spark o r  spark from an extens ion 
cord. Due t o  the  h i gh  temperature 
devel oped, the oxygen re11 i e f  va l  ves opened, 
r e l eas ing  O2 and i n t e n s i f y i n g  the f i r e .  The 
system design and opera t iona l  procedures 
employed con t r i bu ted  t o  the  acc ident .  
APPENDIX B 
DEFINITION OF MISHAPS - NASA SAFETY MANUAL 
TYPE A Any f a t a l i t y ,  f i v e  o r  more persons se r i ous l y  in jured,  
(Acc ident )  $1 00,000 (or  more) damage t o  NASA/NASA con~t r a c t o r  
equ ipment o r  property,  o r  a i r c r a f t  des t r uc t  ion. 
TYPE B Serious i n j u r y  t o  f ou r  (or fewer) persons; p roper ty  
(Accident) damage over $1 0,000 bu t  less  than $1  00,000 t o  
NASA/NASA con t rac to r  equipment o r  proper ty .  
l NC l DENT A mishap ( less than acc ident  s e v e r i t y )  t o  persons o r  
property,  over $250 bu t  less  than $10,000, o r  a  non- 
ser ious i n j u r y .  
M I S S  ION Any event which jeopard izes a  mission, prevents major 
CONTINGENCY miss ion  ob jec t i ve ,  o r  premature miss ion terminat ion.  
AVIATION A NASA (type A o r  B) acc ident  which invo l  wes NASA 
FL l GHT owned o r  operated a i r c r a f t  o r  NASA f l  i g h t  crews, 
ACC l DENT passengers o r  t e s t  personnel w h i l e  on f l  i g h t  duty  
and which occurs a f t e r  the engine(s) has been s t a r t e d  
w i t h  i n t e n t  f o r  f l i g h t .  
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TABLE I. - RUBBER AND SOFT GOODS 
USED IN RESUSCITATOR 
Sample Description Composition 
Pr imary seat Type 6/6 nylon 
O-ring seal  at jet base Butadiene acrylonitrile 
rubber 
Floating member Chloroprene (Neoprene) 
diaphragm rubber 
Floating di aphragm Cotten 
fiber reinforcement 
O-ring seal  at end of Butadiene acrylonitrile 
inlet valve camshaft rubber 
Bellophragm grommet Poly butadiene rubber 
Secondary seat C hloroprene (Neoprene) 
rubber 
Inlet valve seat Tetra-f louro -ethylene 
polymer (TFE Teflon) 
Regulator core O-ring Butadiene acrylonitrile 
rubber 
Upper diaphragm Butadiene acrylonitrile 
rubber 
Upper diaphragm re -  Nylon 
inforced f ibers 
Safety valve rubber Natural rubber 
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Figure 1. - D is t r i bu t ion  of causes of mishaps w i th  l i qu id  
oxygen (more  t h a n  one cause factor is  involved i n  most 
mishaps). 
F igure 2. - D is t r i bu t ion  of causes of mishaps w i th  gaseous 
oxygen (more  t h a n  one  cause factor is involved i n  most 
mishaps). 







Figure 3. - Comparison of cause factors fo r  l i qu id  and gaseous oxygen. 
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F igure 5. - Cutaway sketch of t h e  resuscitator regulator  i l l u s t r a t i n g  t h e  
f u n c t ~ o n ~ n g  posit ion of va r ious  components 
Figure 6. - External view of resusci tator  regulator  i l lust rat in ,  , up tu red  safety valve and f lash 
damage to t h e  pressure gauge. 
Void bu rned  
i n  a l u m i n u m  
Figure 7. - View of i n n e r  sur face of a l u m i n u m  regulator  body. 
FlgUr6 5 .  - Storage and dra lnage d i t ch  area. 
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F i g u r e  9. - L O X  system schemat ic  show ing  LOX c h i l l d o w n  ou t l e t s  to  d i tch.  
F i g u r e  10. - B u r n e d  c a r s  in re la t i on  to oxygen t a n k  and  fence. 
Figure 11. - Damaged ca r  n u m b e r  1. 
Figure 12. - Damaged car n u m b e r  2. 
Figure 13. - Damaged car  number  3. 
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Figure 14. - Apol loISaturn V space vehicle. F igure 15. -Ar rangement  of f u e l  ce l l s  and  cryogenic systems i n  bay 4. 
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Figure 18. - W i r i n g  i n  oxygen tank. 
F igure 19. - Oxygen tank  i n  service module bay. 
CS-54828 
Figure 20. - Damaged Teflon insulation. 
CS-54827 
Figure 21. -Fused thermal switch control. 
